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In 2010, North Korea launched an artillery bombardment of South Korea’s 
Yeonpyeong Island, killing four, wounding 18, and damaging over 100 buildings. 
Despite conventional military superiority, the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-
U.S.) alliance failed to deter this significant North Korean low-intensity  
provocation (LIP).  
This thesis examines the Yeonpyeong deterrence failure to ask how the  
ROK-U.S. alliance can deter North Korean LIP in the future. It examines the 
requirements for conventional deterrence, identifies traits that distinguish conventional 
and nuclear deterrence, and develops an original matrix of conventional deterrence 
criteria that can be applied to specific cases. The thesis then utilizes this matrix for a 
structured case study of the Yeonpyeong bombardment.  
The thesis finds that most of the criteria for successful conventional deterrence 
were absent prior to the Yeonpyeong bombardment, indicating multiple reasons for 
deterrence failure. Among other factors, the alliance ignored intelligence regarding 
increased North Korean military deployments near the island, and had not demonstrated a 
likelihood of response in similar incidents in the past.   
The conclusions provide numerous lessons applying to both future studies of 
conventional deterrence effectiveness and the policy requirements for the ROK-U.S. 
alliance to successfully deter LIP by an increasingly dangerous North Korean regime. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is why the alliance of the United States and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK-U.S. alliance) fails to deter North Korean low intensity provocations (LIP), 
focusing specifically on the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010.  
The ROK-U.S. alliance was made by the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement 
of 1954. The purpose of the alliance is to defend, with U.S. support, the security of the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) against external threats. Historically, however, the alliance has 
not always effectively dealt with LIP security threats by North Korea. The ROK-U.S. 
alliance is strong because the ROK is a mid-power country, and the United States is 
hegemonic. Moreover, the gap of quality and quantity of the alliance’s military power 
against North Korea is huge. Nevertheless, the alliance has failed to deter North Korean 
LIP.  
Most prominently, the alliance failed to deter the North Korean bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong in 2010. The bombardment of Yeonpyeong was an artillery engagement 
between the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the ROK Marine unit in the Yeonpyeong 
Island on November 23, 2010. After the completion of the artillery exercise of the ROK 
Marine unit that aimed at territorial waters of the ROK in the south of the Northern 
Limited Line (NLL), the KPA fired approximate 170 rounds of artillery shells and 
rockets at Yeonpyeong Island. Military and civilian facilities of the ROK were damaged 
by this attack.1  
To explain why the ROK-U.S. alliance did not deter this attack, the thesis will 
specifically examine the following questions: Why does North Korea consistently 
provoke by LIP? Which elements in the ROK-U.S. alliance are applicable to deter low 
intensity provocation? What conditions need to be satisfied to deter LIP? 
                                                 
1Mark McDonald, “‘Crisis Status’ in South Korea after North Shells Island,” New York Times, 
November 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?src=mv. 
 2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis approaches the essence of deterrence against North Korean LIP. Since 
the end of the Korea War, there have been many LIPs by North Korea. Retired four-star 
Gen. Walter L. Sharp, who headed United States Forces in Korea (USFK) command, 
said, “I believe there will be strong provocations, strong attacks by North Korea that 
could quickly escalate into a much bigger conflict.”2 Despite the strength of the ROK-
U.S. alliance, North Korean LIPs are still a threat, and the ROK may be more vulnerable 
to North Korean LIPs than to more drastic North Korean attacks.  
In order to deter those LIPs, there have been corresponding efforts by the ROK 
and the ROK-U.S. alliance. Unfortunately, however, the efforts have not definitively 
achieved the goal. North Korean provocation may occur at any time, so security policy 
must anticipate North Korean LIP. The majority of studies have only analyzed the 
fragmentary reasons for LIP. They seldom focused on the essence of the problem of 
deterring provocations. The core issue is the failure of deterrence, and the bombardment 
of Yeonpyeong in 2010 is a critical case of failure to deter LIP. Through the case study of 
the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, this thesis will enhance understanding of the 
reason for the failure of deterrence for LIP and means to enhance deterrence for LIP.  
Many scholars have suggested some ways of deterring various North Korean 
provocations. The bulk of these studies, however, only focused on deterring North Korea 
from launching major attacks, especially attacks using nuclear weapons. Moreover, many 
analysts have believed that North Korean LIP could be deterred by the ROK or the ROK-
U.S. alliance with the overwhelming gap of military power. They also thought that the 
LIP could be controlled separately without escalation to a nuclear crisis. However, the 
challenges of LIP and a nuclear crisis have to be handled together. As Gen. Sharp 
mentioned, LIP could escalate into a nuclear crisis. This is why LIP is important. 
Therefore, this thesis will concentrate on explaining the failure to deter the North Korean 
                                                 
2Wyatt Olson, “Retired USFK Head: North Korea Collapse May Happen Sooner,” Military.com, 25 
May 25, 2016, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/05/25/retired-usfk-head-north-korea-collapse-
may-happen-sooner.html. 
 3 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, because this is a meaningful case to understand 
the broader security mechanisms on the Korean Peninsula. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To begin with, it is necessary to clarify the terminology of “North Korean 
provocation.” In their work, many scholars use different terminology to discuss the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Hannah Fischer said:  
The term “provocation” is defined to include armed invasion; border 
violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnaping; 
terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threat/intimidation 
against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement 
aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions 
undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic 
missiles and nuclear weapons.3  
For this thesis, three criteria distinguish such acts: (1) the targets of provocative action 
are specific; (2) there is a state behind the act; (3) the crisis could escalate to total war. By 
this definition, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 can be termed North Korean 
provocation.  
Provocations can be categorized into two types: high intensity and low intensity. 
Following these criteria, armed invasion is high-intensity provocation.  
The U.S. Department of the Army offers a relevant definition of low intensity 
conflict (LIC). According to this, LIC is “political-military confrontation between 
contending states or groups below conventional wars and above the routine, peaceful 
competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing 
principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of 
armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, 
informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, 
generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implication.”4 
                                                 
3Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007 (CRS Report RL30004), 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007, 1. 
4United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–20: Military Operations in Low Intensity 
Conflict, December 5, 1990, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/
10020ch1.htm#s_9. 
 4 
Here, however, low intensity conflict could be a state or a non-state group. This thesis 
will use the term provocation to refer to actions by states because North Korea is a state, 
not a group. Therefore, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 was low intensity 
provocation. 
Sun Tzu stated, “Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme 
excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without 
fighting.”5 This famous saying suggests that it is better to deter provocations rather than 
to retaliate after provocations occur. Pre-existing studies dealing with deterrence have 
been more focused on a possible nuclear crisis rather than LIP on the Korea Peninsula. 
North Korean LIP, however, is also a crucial danger threatening the security of the ROK. 
From the perspective of crisis escalation, LIP should also be deterred. Then, the main 
concern is which elements are prerequisites for deterrence of LIP specifically?  This 
thesis will seek to answer this question by focusing on the reasons for failures to deter 
North Korean LIP.  
Established studies explained that responsibility for North Korean LIP belongs to 
the ROK because North Korean LIP has occurred in peacetime, and the ROK has 
peacetime operational control. These studies then blame the ROK’s military for not 
counteracting such LIP actively and effectively.6 But this assessment overlooks how, 
since the ROK-U.S. alliance was made in 1950, the alliance has always been the main 
agency for the security of the ROK. Thus, given the core concern that LIP could escalate 
into high intensity conflict, the ROK-U.S. alliance also has a role to play in deterrence of 
LIP.  
                                                 
5Tzu, Sun, The Art of War, trans. by Lionel Giles (Boston, MA; London: Shambhala Publications, 
2011), 15. 
6Jaewook Jung, “North Korean Military Provocation and Strategic Tasks,” The Korean Association of 
International Studies (August 2011): 191, http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE01682052; Yong-Sup Han 
and Sang Hyuk Jeong, “Political, Economical, Military Analysis of the Wartime Operational Control 
Authority Transfer Issue: Theory, Evaluation, Countermeasures,” Journal of International Politics 20, no. 1 
(Seoul: Ilmin International Relations Institute, April 2015): 6, http://dx.doi.org/10.18031/
jip.2015.04.20.1.5. 
 5 
This thesis addresses the intersection of three main topics: 1) the role of the ROK-
U.S. alliance, 2) deterrence, and 3) LIP. Pre-existing studies have not analyzed this 
intersection.  
The rest of this literature review considers how some prior work has addressed 
some of these three main topics intersecting in this thesis. 
1. The ROK-U.S. Alliance and North Korean LIP 
What agency is in charge of deterrence against North Korean LIP? Pre-existing 
studies argued that the ROK is the main agency for the deterrence against LIP by North 
Korea. Jaewook Jung said, “The ROK has failed to deter the provocation by North Korea, 
because the ROK does not have military power to overwhelm North Korean military. 
Moreover, the retaliatory power of the ROK’s military has restricted by the principle of 
proportion on the armistice rules of engagement.”7 His argument is locked in the 
framework of operational control. The U.S. took operational control (OPCON) of South 
Korean forces during the Korean War back in the early 1950s. Peacetime OPCON was 
returned in 1994. Until 1994, a U.S. four-star Commander had the responsibility and the 
authority of the ROK military in peacetime, as well as in potential wartime.8 With the 
framework of peacetime OPCON, many scholars concluded that the primary 
responsibility for conventional deterrence against North Korean LIP is with the ROK 
military.  
Doug Bandow argues provocatively, “The U.S.-ROK military alliance has lost its 
purpose. South Korea is not critical to America’s defense and America’s assistance is 
not—or at least should not be—critical to South Korea’s defense.”9 He explained: “For 
instance, the North might hope to seize Seoul, located just south of the DMZ, and then 
                                                 
7Jaewook Jung, “NK’s Military Provocation and Embodiment of Proactive Deterrence,” The Korean 
Journal of International Studies 52, no. 1 (2012): 145, http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE01817184. 
8 “OPCON Transfer,” Global Security.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/usfk-
opcon.htm. 
9Doug Bandow, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous,” Foreign 
Policy Briefing (Cato Institute, 2010): 7, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/us-south-korea-
alliance-outdated-unnecessary-and-dangerous. 
 6 
negotiate a ceasefire. No doubt South Korea should prepare for such a contingency. But, 
again, the responsibility for defending Seoul lies with the ROK, not the United States.”10 
But LIP by North Korea could escalate into greater threats to the ROK. Such 
threats to the ROK have to be dealt with by the ROK-U.S. alliance because those are the 
terms of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement. According to article two of the 
ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, “The Parties will consult together whenever, in 
the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the 
Parties is threatened by external armed attack.”11 Moreover, Stephen M. Walt said that 
“an alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or 
more sovereign states.”12 Therefore, to deter LIP is not only the ROK’s consideration. 
The ROK-U.S. alliance logically has to deal with the all threats including low intensity 
provocations.  
Nevertheless, some would prefer that the LIP be deterred by the ROK 
singlehanded, due to anxiety over entrapment by the United States. The ROK-U.S. 
Alliance expresses the familiar tension between abandonment and entrapment explained 
by Glenn H. Snyder: “The first gives rise to fears of the ally’s defection and perhaps 
realignment; the second generates worries about being dragged into a war over the ally’s 
interests that one does not share.”13  
Some consider that the United States left responsibility for LIP to the ROK’s 
military under the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. John G. Keilers explained that “President 
Nixon’s doctrine consisted of three major tenets. First, the U.S. would honor all of its 
treaty agreements. Secondly, the U.S. would provide a shield if a nuclear power 
threatened an ally or a country the U.S. deemed to be vital to its national security. And, 
lastly, the U.S. would provide military and economic aid to countries under treaty 
                                                 
10Ibid., 5.  
11“United States of America-Republic of Korea Treaty,” The American Journal of International Law 
48, no. 3 (1954): 147, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2213963.pdf. 
12Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 12.  
13Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 
1: 103 (1990): 113, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357226?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
7 
agreements, but the requesting nation would be expected to bear primary responsibility to 
provide the manpower for its own defense.”14  
The other issue LIP raises is the matter of the right of self-defense. Pre-existing 
studies argued that provocation, such as the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, 
should be counteracted as the right of self-defense, not punishment of violence under the 
Armistice Agreement. At the moment of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, 
there was a conflict about responding on the basis of the right of self-defense 
or the punishment of violence of the Armistice.15 There were different perceptions 
between the White House spokesman and Walter L. Sharp, who was the United 
Nations Forces Commander, the commander of the U.S. Forces Korea and the 
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).16 
This conflict is still ongoing. As mentioned earlier, the two types OPCON and the 
purpose of the alliance make it difficult to answer which is correct, between the right of 
self-defense and the punishment of violence under the Armistice.  
Overall, pre-existing studies have just focused on a single primary phenomenon of 
LIP without appreciating how the ROK’s security has been based on the ROK-U.S. 
Mutual Defense Agreement since 1953.  
2. Conventional Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence
In the study of deterrence, Thomas C. Schelling provides thinking central to this 
thesis. As Robert R. Tomes stated, “Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Arms 
and Influence (1966) are two classics of deterrence theory.”17 And, Phil Williams has 
provided a cogent summary of Schelling’s influence on deterrence theory as follows: 
14John G. Keilers, “Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization,” WWW.ARMY.MIL, https://www.army.mil/
article/3867/Nixon_Doctrine_and_Vietnamization. 
15Hwee-Rhak Park, “‘Resolute Response’ and ‘Prevention of Escalation’ Regarding North Korean 
Provocations: Appropriate Application of Self-defense and Rules of Engagement,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies (Korea Research Institute for Strategy, May 2012): 100.  
16Jongdae Kim, Secret Files: The War in the Yellow Sea (Seoul: Medich Media, 2013), 242. Trans. by 
the author. 
17Robert R. Tomes, “Nuclear Strategy, Deterrence, Compellence, and Risk(y?) Management: Thomas 
Schelling Meets Joint Vision 2010,” Military Operations Research Symposium (Quantico, VA: June 1997), 
1.
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The contribution made by Thomas Schelling to nuclear strategy was both 
immense and unique. Schelling brought to the subject a subtlety and 
sophistication which were rarely equaled let alone surpassed by other 
strategists. His work had a rare combination of rigor and imagination, and 
the contribution that he made to the understanding of deterrence, coercion 
and arms control was highly distinctive and of major importance.… It is 
impossible to deny the richness of his insights or the significance of his 
contribution.18 
Shelling classifies the use of military power into two categories. The first is to use 
military power actually for victory; this is further divided into defense and offense. The 
other strategy is to threaten using military power for influencing an aggressor’s actions; 
this is also further divided into deterrence and compellence. He defines deterrence: 
“Deterrence involves setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by 
incurring the obligation—and waiting. The overt act is up to the opponent.”19 He also 
defines compellence: “Compellence, in contrast, usually involves initiating an action (or 
an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or become harmless, only if the 
opponent responds. The overt act, the first step, is up to the side that makes the 
compellent threat.”20 He defines coercion: “Coercion covers the meaning but 
unfortunately includes ‘deterrent’ as well as ‘compellent’ intentions.”21  
There are other scholars’ definitions of coercion. Daniel L. Byman and Matthew 
C. Waxman define coercion: “Coercion is the use of threatened force, including the 
limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an aggressor to behave 
differently than it otherwise would.”22 On the other hand, Edward Luttwak introduces the 
new term instead of coercion that “armed suasion is to ‘deterrence’ (or ‘dissuasion’) what 
strength in general is to defensive strength.”23 
                                                 
18Phil William, “Thomas Schelling,” in Makers of Nuclear Strategy, ed. by John Baylis and John 
Garnett (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 120. 
19Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 71. 
20Ibid., 72. 
21Ibid., 71. 
22Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” 
International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), 9. 
23Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 218. 
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As its most basic, deterrence means to dissuade an aggressor from beginning 
some special behavior; compellence is to persuade an aggressor to stop some special 
behavior that had started already or to induce some special behavior against an 
aggressor’s intention. The ways of deterrence and compellence are threat and assurance. 
Schelling explains that “any coercive threat requires corresponding assurances; the object 
of a threat is to give somebody a choice. To say, ‘One more step and I shoot,’ can be a 
deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, ‘And if you stop I 
won’t.’”24  
Moreover, deterrence is divided into two categories: deterrence by punishment 
and deterrence by denial. Glenn Snyder has explained these categories as follows: 
A “denial” response, especially if it involves the use of nuclear weapons 
tactically, can mean high direct cost, plus the risk that the war may get out 
of hand and ultimately involve severe nuclear punishment for both sides. 
This prospect of cost and risk may exert a significant deterring effect. A 
“punishment” response, if powerful enough, may foreclose territorial 
gains, and limited reprisals may be able to force a settlement short of 
complete conquest of the territorial objective.25  
With the concept of unacceptable damage, many scholars have concentrated on 
nuclear strategy when they mention deterrence. For instance, Michael S. Gerson 
observes, “Deterrence theory was developed against the backdrop of the Cold War 
nuclear arms race and focused on the prevention of nuclear conflict.”26 From the 
perspective of states, unacceptable damage could be made from nuclear weapons. On the 
other hand, the scale of violence can vary, so there can be various types of deterrence. 
Therefore, deterrence is not only a matter of nuclear strategy. Borrowing from 
Schelling’s studies, deterrence also applies to situations involving conventional weapons 
or LIP.  
                                                 
24Schelling, Arms and Influence, 74. 
25Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 15. 
26Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters: U.S. Army 
War College 39, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 34. 
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In this sense, conventional deterrence has important features in its own right. 
Lieutenant Colonel Wendy L. Lichtenstein has noted:  
…changes in alliances and coalitions from the Cold War to post-Cold War 
era clearly illustrate why conventional deterrence became dominant. 
Achieving consensus among alliances and coalitions is inherently difficult 
but gaining acceptance for the use of a nuclear deterrent in this construct 
would be exponentially difficult. Having to consider participant interests 
in order to achieve compromise and successful multilateral action greatly 
complicates the use of any nuclear deterrent, making conventional 
deterrence more acceptable.27 
Moreover, Gerson also considered the importance of conventional deterrence: 
“While the majority of academic research and public debate was concerned with the 
prevention of nuclear war—the net result was that deterrence became synonymous with 
nuclear weapons—conventional deterrence, appropriately, assumed an increasingly 
important role in the development of military strategy during this period.”28  
Overall, even though a majority of scholars have concentrated on deterrence in 
nuclear strategy, conventional deterrence has also been considered significantly. Indeed, 
scholars such as Schelling and Snyder were concerned about not only deterring 
conventional conflict itself, but also deterring conventional conflict in contexts where 
escalation to nuclear conflict was a serious concern. 
3. Conventional Deterrence for North Korean LIP 
Pre-existing studies have usually focused on nuclear issues rather than on LIP 
when they researched North Korean provocations. It is an obvious fact that a nuclear 
weapon is a question of life or death for the nation. Crises that could lead to nuclear 
weapons use, however, are likely to begin at some level of conventional conflict. 
Therefore, conventional deterrence should be considered significantly as well.  
In this context, the United States has provided extended nuclear deterrence to the 
ROK. Michael McDevitt said that “[t]he Obama administration has been attentive to the 
                                                 
27Wendy L. Lichtenstein, “Conventional Military Deterrence—Its Rise to Dominance and Its Future,” 
Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002): 12. 
28Gerson, Conventional Deterrence, 34. 
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importance of extended deterrence, the provision of the so-called nuclear umbrella to 
friends and allies threatened by states like North Korea that possess or are seeking 
nuclear weapons.”29 This extended deterrence does not mean deterrence only by nuclear 
weapons. McDevitt explained that “[h]istorically, extended deterrence has been based on 
the combination of the strategic nuclear triad (sea-, air-, and land-based delivery 
platforms), tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons permanently stationed abroad, and 
U.S. based weapons that could be deployed quickly in the case of emergencies.”30 This is 
an important understanding of the breadth of extended deterrence because it applies to 
any potential North Korean provocation, not just use of a nuclear weapon.  
The challenge of deterring LIP in the context of extended deterrence directs 
attention to the characteristics of North Korea. Deterrence theory is based on rationality. 
Patrick M. Morgan has said that “[d]eterrence theory and deterrence had appeal if 
described as rational in conception and action.”31 Rationality, however, simplifies the 
process of making a decision, leaving out various elements that are preference, faith, and 
psychological incompleteness. This idea of decision-making simplifies excessively, so it 
conflicts with how actual performers make decisions.32 These factors are vital in order to 
understand North Korean thinking about LIP; so deterrence theory should be enlarged 
from nuclear issues to conventional deterrence in order to account for these factors in 
deterring North Korean LIP.  
In addition, many scholars have mentioned that it is hard to apply conventional 
deterrence to North Korean LIP, because there is a problem calculating the escalation of a 
crisis. North Korea has nuclear weapons. Bryan Monroe has said that, “A U.S. official 
who briefed reporters in Seoul said that North Korea ‘has demonstrated at least three 
                                                 
29Michael McDevitt, “Deterring North Korean Provocations,” Brookings East Asia Commentary no. 
46 (Washington, DC: Brookings, February 2011): http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/
north-korea-mcdevitt. 
30Ibid. 
31Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 12. 
32Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics 41 (January 1989): 187, 
doi: 10.2307/2010407. 
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times now that they can detonate a nuclear weapon.’”33 Thus, LIP could escalate into a 
nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to gauge at what time a point of 
escalation would occur. According to Ken E. Gause, “Any discussion of deterrence 
should be tied to considerations of escalation…. North Korea’s calculus is tied largely to 
the personality and predilections of an individual.”34 Because LIP could escalate into 
nuclear crisis quickly, many scholars consider that North Korean provocations are a 
nuclear crisis automatically. Nevertheless, conventional deterrence is still significant. If it 
were possible to deter LIP from the beginning, the escalation of the crisis would be no 
problem.  
Lastly, the conditions of deterrence are also the reason for focusing on a North 
Korean nuclear crisis rather than LIP. There are two essential conditions, capability and 
willingness, for successful deterrence. The capability means ability to return unacceptable 
damage to an aggressor when the aggressor initiates an assault with a weapon. The 
problem, however, is that from the perspective of conventional deterrence it is difficult to 
find out what is unacceptable damage to an aggressor. In the case of North Korea and 
conventional deterrence, it is difficult because that nation’s level of acceptable damage is 
not known and may be very high. Edward Rhodes has said, “Potential aggressors 
regularly have proven [undeterrable] despite the best efforts of intelligent, committed 
[deterrers] possessing superior conventional military capabilities.”35  
To increase the credibility of the threat of retaliation, it is essential to give an 
obvious message of the plans to retaliate when an aggressor provokes. Morgan has said 
that, under the logic of deterrence, conveying some information to the challenger with 
great clarity, especially about one’s military capabilities, is beneficial.36 In conventional 
deterrence, there is a particular problem of informational asymmetry. Jaewook Jung has 
                                                 
33Bryan Monroe, “5 Things We Still Don’t Know about North Korea’s Nukes,” CNN Politics, April 
12, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/12/politics/5-things-north-korea-nukes. 
34Ken E. Gause, “North Korea’s Provocation and Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un 
Regime,” Center for Naval Analyses (August 2015): 46, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2015-U-
011060.pdf. 
35Edward Rhodes, “Conventional Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy 19, no. 3 (2000): 223. 
36Morgan, “Deterrence Now,” 15–19. 
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observed that “[p]otential aggressors could make alternative ways to escape the threat of 
retaliation by exploiting the message from opponents.”37 For instance, if the ROK-U.S. 
alliance prepared new methods for attacking the origin of provocation and gave such a 
message to North Korea for deterrence, North Korea could devise alternative ways to 
provoke after recognizing the alliance’s intended response.  
Deterrence (not only conventional deterrence, but also nuclear deterrence) has 
another problem: willingness. Willingness means the credibility for retaliation. Pre-
existing studies explained that the willingness for retaliation is a core element for 
successful deterrence. There are many obstacles to practicing retaliation such as 
experiences in the past or characteristics of national leadership.  
Especially in a democratic system, which is affected easily by public opinion, 
leadership can find it difficult to commit to such a policy, and that may prevent leaders 
from showing a strong willingness to retaliate.38 For instance, Israel has a well-trained 
military and strong willingness for retaliation, but also has political weakness that comes 
from the pressure of adverse public opinion or political opponents. So, they have 
difficulty deterring adversaries’ LIP. Jonathan Shimshoni has said that “the divergent 
internal political-cultural attributes of Israel and her Arab neighbors have undermined the 
credibility and efficacy of many of Israel’s deterrent threats.”39  
Pre-existing studies have only focused on a defender’s willingness to retaliate 
against an aggressor’s provocations. But, in order to activate deterrence, an aggressor’s 
ability to understand the defender’s willingness for deterrence is also important. 
Therefore, deterrence is linked with communication, and hinges on the strong conflict 
between a defender’s willingness for retaliation against provocations and an aggressor’s 
willingness to undertake provocations. Thus, the willingness of the aggressor has to be 
considered. In this context, even though North Korean willingness to provoke in 2010 
                                                 
37Jaewook Jung, “NK’s Military Provocation,” 141. 
38Ibid., 142. 
39Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 224–225. 
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was apparently strong, there are not enough studies about their willingness to undertake 
provocations. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis explores the reason for the failure to deter North Korean LIP. The 
most important issue is which requirements can deter North Korean LIP. As mentioned in 
the literature review, there are two core conditions for deterrence, capability and 
credibility. This thesis examines the hypothesis that credibility may be more important 
for conventional deterrence than capability, even though celebrated scholars have argued 
that capability is more significant than credibility. Moreover, in the North Korean case, 
credibility and capability may have different roles for achieving conventional deterrence.  
In addition to the requirements for conventional deterrence, the situation of an 
aggressor is also significant. Even though a defender may be well prepared to deter 
provocation with capability and willingness, an aggressor may carry out provocation 
anyway if it has strong motives for provocation, or a strong tolerance for high levels of 
acceptable retaliation, or if its decision making departs from deterrence theory’s 
expectations of rational action. This thesis examines the hypothesis that deterring North 
Korean LIP poses unique challenges in these respects. 
Lastly, the escalation of crisis is also an important issue in conventional 
deterrence. When an aggressor provokes through conventional weapons against a 
defender, an aggressor may consider the escalation of crisis. Although a defender could 
withstand an attack by conventional weapons, it is less likely to withstand a nuclear 
attack. A defender, then, might hesitate to retaliate because the retaliation may cause a 
bigger retaliation by an aggressor. This dynamic escalation may make conventional 
deterrence more challenging. This thesis examines the hypothesis that conventional 
deterrence of North Korea is more difficult because of different perceptions of concern 
over escalation.  
Overall, it is necessary to address various elements in analyzing conventional 
deterrence. To examine the reason for the failure of conventional deterrence against 
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North Korean LIP in 2010, it is necessary to analyze these diverse elements 
comprehensively.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis focuses on a single case study about the bombardment of Yeonpyeong 
in 2010 to explain the failure of conventional deterrence against North Korean LIP. The 
case study is narrative and qualitative, not comparative or quantitative. To analyze the 
single case, this thesis examines conventional deterrence from the bottom up. Therefore, 
this thesis uncovers which element is related with conventional deterrence in the early 
phase of LIP. After that, this thesis applies the elements of conventional deterrence to the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Following that, this thesis explains the reasons for 
the failure of conventional deterrence. Finally, this thesis provides some lessons learned 
and makes suggestions for future research.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
First, this thesis studies the roots of conventional deterrence. Conventional 
deterrence is a branch of deterrence. The study explains what deterrence is and which 
requirements are necessary for achieving deterrence. After that, the definition of 
conventional deterrence is further clarified through a comparison with nuclear deterrence. 
Basically, there are two requirements for conventional deterrence, capability and 
credibility. This thesis examines the function of these factors in the Korean context in 
detail. Particularly, this thesis focuses on credibility rather than capability. The most 
difficult task in studying credibility as it relates to conventional deterrence is to 
understand how an aggressor assesses a defender’s credibility. This thesis draws on some 
scholars’ ideas to solve that task. In this process, it is possible to analyze which 
requirement is important in each phase of provocation. In addition, not only is the 
defender’s capability and credibility important, but also the aggressor’s situation. 
Normally, it is easy to think that conventional deterrence is related with only the 
preparation of a defender. If, however, an aggressor has very strong motives for 
provocation, the defender’s effort at conventional deterrence can be useless. Therefore, it 
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is necessary to understand the aggressor’s situation for achieving real conventional 
deterrence.  
Second, this thesis provides a table to apply the requirements for conventional 
deterrence to a case of provocation. This table can be helpful to understand the 
importance of requirements in conventional deterrence at a glance. Moreover, this task 
suggests future research about another case of conventional deterrence.  
Third, this thesis examines deeply into the case of the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong in 2010 with analyzed requirements for conventional deterrence. This 
examination explains the reasons for the failure of conventional deterrence in the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010.  
Finally, this thesis extracts some lessons from the examination of the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, and suggests some relevant prescriptions for 
conventional deterrence in the future. Moreover, this thesis introduces some future 
research that was beyond the scope of this study. 
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II. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
The failure to deter North Korean LIP is an example of the failure of conventional 
deterrence. Thus, in order to find out the reason for the failure to deter North Korean LIP, 
it is necessary to understand what conventional deterrence is. Conventional deterrence is 
a subordinate concept of deterrence. Therefore, in order to understand conventional 
deterrence, it would be better to begin by examining what deterrence is. After defining 
the term of deterrence, this chapter explains important elements of conventional 
deterrence and compares nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence. Then, this 
chapter extracts some key specific issues regarding deterrence of LIP.  
Following this process, this chapter summarizes the criteria to explain reasons for 
the failure of conventional deterrence in a simple table that can be used to evaluate how 
the criteria apply to any particular case. Chapter 3 then utilizes this table to evaluate the 
criteria for conventional deterrence in the critical case of the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong in 2010.  
A. THE ROOTS OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE  
Conventional deterrence comes from deterrence. To understand conventional 
deterrence, it is necessary to study deterrence itself. So, this section examines the 
definition of deterrence and studies the requirements of conventional deterrence.  
1. Definition of Deterrence 
To achieve the security of a state, a state should prevent any attempt to change the 
status quo by a challenger. In general, a state tries to keep the status quo by diplomatic 
ways. But a challenger may try to change the status quo by force. Then, a state cannot 
help relying on the role of military. Therefore, deterrence is based on military power.40  
Deterrence could be defined in various dimensions. It is helpful to examine 
definitions that were advanced by past scholars. Allyssa Demus has effectively organized 
                                                 
40 Jae Yeop Kim and Jong Ha Kim, “Enhancing Korea’s Conventional Deterrence Strategy,” New Asia 
68, no. 3 (Fall 2011),:118, http://nari.re.kr/bbs/board.php?bo_table=newasia_1&wr_id=668&page=9. 
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those past scholars’ definitions of deterrence. Previous scholars such as Glenn Snyder, 
Herman Khan, and Thomas Schelling defined the meaning of deterrence as follows: 
• “Discouraging the enemy from taking action by posing for him a prospect 
of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain.”41 
• “Specifying all alternatives available to the enemy, and then the various 
threats and promises we can make to influence his choice among these 
alternatives.”42 
• “The exploitation of potential force. It is concerned with persuading a 
potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of 
activity.”43 
• “The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a 
state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of 
unacceptable counteraction.”44 
In summary, deterrence is the behavior that persuades existential or potential 
enemies to give up their militarily hostile action before it is put into practice. Jonathan 
Shimshoni suggests another definition: “Deterrence is a specific coercive phenomenon: a 
defender’s dissuasion—through the use of implied, explicit, stated, or demonstrated 
threats—of an opponent’s intention to undertake or expand violent action.”45 Therefore, 
the core of deterrence is to manipulate “an aggressor’s estimation of the cost/benefit 
                                                 
41Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 3, quoted in Alyssa Demus, “Conventional Versus Nuclear: Assessing 
Comparative Deterrent Utilities,” Army Capabilities Integration Center, 8, accessed October 8, 2016, 
http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/SLTF/
Conventional%20Versus%20Nuclear%20Assessing%20Comparative%20Deterrent%20Utilities.pdf. 
42Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1960), 126, 
quoted in Alyssa Demus, “Conventional Versus Nuclear: Assessing Comparative Deterrent Utilities,” Army 
Capabilities Integration Center, 8, accessed October 8, 2016, http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/
SLTF/Conventional%20Versus%20Nuclear%20Assessing%20Comparative%20Deterrent%20Utilities.pdf. 
43Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 139, 
quoted in Alyssa Demus, “Conventional Versus Nuclear: Assessing Comparative Deterrent Utilities,” Army 
Capabilities Integration Center, 8, accessed October 8, 2016, http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/
SLTF/Conventional%20Versus%20Nuclear%20Assessing%20Comparative%20Deterrent%20Utilities.pdf. 
44Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 2012), 139, 
quoted in Alyssa Demus, “Conventional Versus Nuclear: Assessing Comparative Deterrent Utilities,” Army 
Capabilities Integration Center, 8, accessed October 8, 2016, http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/
SLTF/Conventional%20Versus%20Nuclear%20Assessing%20Comparative%20Deterrent%20Utilities.pdf. 
45 Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 5. 
 19 
calculation of taking a given action,” according to Austin G. Long.46 Therefore, 
deterrence is “the threat of force intended to convince a potential aggressor not to 
undertake a particular action because the costs will be unacceptable or the probability of 
success extremely low.”47 
There are some requirements to achieve deterrence. Alexander L. George and 
Richard Smoke have argued there are three requirements for deterrence: “(1) the full 
formulation of one’s intent to protect a nation; (2) the acquisition and deployment of 
capacities to back up the intent; and (3) the communication of the intent to the potential 
‘aggressor.’”48 In their perspective, a state should have capability and credibility to 
retaliate against adversaries’ hostile behaviors. Moreover, the communication of the 
state’s intent to adversaries is also important. Robert Jervis argued that there are two 
requirements for deterrence. He said that “successful deterrence requires a combination 
of capabilities and credibility. These two sets of factors are not entirely separate; the 
ability to block the aggressor at low cost increases credibility.”49 Therefore, there are two 
requirements for deterrence, capability and credibility.   
As mentioned previously, deterrence is to stem an aggressor’s hostile behavior. 
Then, that raises the issue of how a defender achieves deterrence. In other words, what is 
necessary to stop an aggressor’s antagonistic behavior? The way of deterrence is the way 
of distinguishing between nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence. Since the birth 
of nuclear weapons, much deterrence thinking has focused on the issue of nuclear 
weapons, because nuclear weapons are the most threatening weapons facing an aggressor 
who must estimate the cost/benefit calculation of taking a given action. According to 
Demus, “One of the smaller warheads in the current U.S. arsenal, the W76, has a yield of 
                                                 
46Austin G. Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of Rand 
Deterrence Research (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2008), 7. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG636.pdf. 
47Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters (Quarterly 
Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn 2009): 34.  
48Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 64. 
49Robert Jervis, “What Do We Want to Deter and How Do we Deter It?” in Turning Point: The Gulf 
War and U.S. Military Strategy, ed. L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994), 127. 
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100 kilotons. As a point of comparison, the nuclear weapon deployed in the bombing of 
Hiroshima possessed a yield of 15 kilotons. It killed one fourth of Hiroshima’s population 
(approximately 70,000 people) in the initial blast.”50  
Even though nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons, the problem is 
whether a state will actually use nuclear weapons. Stephen M. Younger has said that “the 
notion of ‘deterrence’ was refined to emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in preventing 
any provocative action on the part of the Soviets—any move that threatened the United 
States or its allies would bring a swift and devastating response.”51 But once the Soviet 
Union attained strategic parity, it was recognized that, paradoxically, nuclear weapons 
likely would not be used in response to Soviet conventional action. Strategic stability 
undermined deterrence of conventional aggression—the “stability-instability paradox.”52 
In order to stop an aggressor’s hostile conventional behavior, a defender should prepare 
conventional responses. Therefore, conventional deterrence is considered one of the 
alternatives to nuclear deterrence.  
2. Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence Compared 
Conventional deterrence is deterrence through conventional force. Conventional 
force means military power except nuclear weapons. Shimshoni supports those 
definitions. According to Shimshoni, “I define a conventional situation as one in which 
neither defender nor challenger has immediate access to nuclear weapons, though their 
allies may be nuclear powers.”53 When a defender cannot achieve deterrence with 
nuclear weapons, a defender should exploit conventional deterrence. In the same context, 
according to Mearsheimer, conventional deterrence is defined as “a function of the 
capability of denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional forces.”54 
                                                 
50Demus, “Conventional Versus Nuclear,” 11. 
51Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: a New History (New York: Ecco Press, 2009), 51. 
52Robert Jervis, “Arms Control, Stability, and Cause of War,” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 
(Summer 1993): 247, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152010. 
53Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 2.  
54John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 15. 
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In a nutshell, conventional deterrence would be the other main stream of deterrence in the 
situation of the limited use of nuclear weapons.  
Then, what characteristics are different between nuclear deterrence and 
conventional deterrence? Even though the difference starts in what weapons are used for 
deterrence, the effects of the difference in weapons are diverse and huge. Shimshoni 
organizes the different characteristics between nuclear deterrence and conventional 
deterrence in an easily accessible manner as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Comparison of Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence.55 
Characteristic Nuclear deterrence Conventional deterrence 
Mode of threat Punishment (costs) Object denial (and punishment) 
Dimensions of threat 
credibility 







Game of Chicken 
Can be asymmetric 
Very susceptible to outside involvement  
Dynamic 
Can be nonstrategic  
May be any structure 
Requirements of 
shared knowledge 
and importance of 
detail 
Minimal, detail not important; desire 
to share critical knowledge 
Maximal; detail critical; ambivalent 
desire to share critical knowledge 
Convertibility and 
brinkmanship 
Highly convertible between levels; 
brinkmanship effective 
Convertibility and brinkmanship 




Status quo clear; d-c easy to 
differentiate; compellence more 
difficult 
Status quo not clear; d-c difficult to 




Mutual fear of punishment 
dominates; deterrence always relevant 
May or may not be, depending on 
structure of relationship 
Success/failure Clear, dichotomous Not clear; dependent on time frame 
and level of analysis 
 
                                                 
55Source: Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 27. 
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Examination of Shimshoni’s table leads to an appealing question about classified 
characteristics of nuclear and conventional deterrence. That is, what is the fundamental 
reason for distinguishing the characteristics between nuclear and conventional 
deterrence? The crucial reason for the occurrence of those differences comes from 
different tolerances for nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. Even though a 
country may not accept the destructive power of nuclear weapons, it may accept the 
threat of conventional weapons. Therefore, a country can design conventional responses 
in defense of conventional attack. This dynamic structure of conflict is naturally linked 
with the escalation of crisis. As a result, due to complicated elements and structures, a 
defender should consider more diverse conditions to achieve conventional deterrence 
than nuclear weapons. This is why conventional deterrence is complex, and leaders have 
to be concerned with conventional deterrence.  
In addition, past scholars have argued that conventional deterrence has different 
requirements than nuclear deterrence. According to Morgan, “We can also briefly 
summarize the debates about what was needed, in association with nuclear deterrence, for 
deterrence on the conventional level. Three positions emerged: deterrence by a capacity 
to fight then escalate, by a capacity to deny, and by a capacity to defeat.”56  In his 
perspective, the main requirements of conventional deterrence are focused on capability. 
It is reasonable to assume that his concerns about the requirements of conventional 
deterrence came from the possibility of using these capabilities in response to an 
aggressor’s attack, unlike a nuclear response that would entail unacceptable damage. But, 
are Morgan’s requirements suitable for conventional deterrence? Is it correct to 
emphasize the capability for conventional deterrence? It is necessary to find out what 
elements are commensurate with conventional deterrence. The following section 
examines the important elements of conventional deterrence.  
 
                                                 
56Morgan, Deterrence Now, 25. 
 23 
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
Past scholars have explained that there are two important types of deterrence: 
deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. According to Mearsheimer, “There is 
a well-known distinction between deterrence based on punishment, which involves 
threatening to destroy large portions of an opponent’s civilian population and industry, 
and deterrence based on denial, which requires convincing an opponent that he will not 
attain his goals on the battlefield.”57 In his argument, it is possible to assume that 
deterrence by punishment would be a more common form of nuclear deterrence and 
deterrence by denial would be the way of conventional deterrence. Samuel P. Huntington 
concurs: “Deterrence itself, that is, the effort to influence enemy intentions, may be 
pursued through both ‘denial capabilities—typically, conventional ground, sea, and 
tactical air forces’ and ‘punishment capabilities—typically, strategic nuclear power for 
either massive or limited retaliation.”58 Then, is the denial capability the most important 
requirement for conventional deterrence? Are the other requirements for deterrence not 
relevant to conventional deterrence? In order to answer those questions, this section 
examines the meaning of each requirement, and finally, uncovers the most important 
requirement for conventional deterrence.  
1. Capability 
A defender must have capability for achieving conventional deterrence. 
Capability can be categorized as denial capability and punishment capability. This section 
minutely examines those capabilities. 
a. Denial Capability 
Denial capability is an important requirement for conventional deterrence. Denial 
capability has three of its own features. First, denial capability is defensive capability. 
Past scholars have argued that deterrence by denial is the core value of conventional 
deterrence. “Conventional deterrence is primarily based on deterrence by denial, the 
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ability to prevent an aggressor from achieving its objectives through conflict,” claims 
Gerson.59 This concept comes from the belief that the conventional military power of an 
aggressor could be incapacitated by defensive capability. Therefore, deterrence by denial 
means defensive capability. Defenders, for instance, could defend the shelling of an 
aggressor through trenches or armored vehicles. Huntington also supports this concept: 
“In current NATO planning, nuclear and conventional capabilities can both be used for 
defensive purpose; only nuclear capabilities can be used for retaliatory purpose.”60  
Second, offensive capability is also denial capability. This offensive capability 
means the capability of counterattack. A defender could stem the ongoing offensive 
behavior of an aggressor through counterattack. A defender, for instance, could quickly 
counterattack the origin point of an aggressor’s shelling through the defender’s artilleries, 
when an aggressor’s artilleries were opening fire. At the end of the day, the purpose of 
deterrence by denial is to obstruct the goal or willingness of an aggressor. According to 
Carl Von Clausewitz, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”61 
In the same context, an aggressor would pursue political goals or willingness through 
provocations. If a defender can stem the ongoing offensive behaviors of an aggressor by 
the capabilities of counterattack, an aggressor cannot achieve political goals or 
willingness.  
Third, a defender could stem the quick victory of an aggressor through denial 
capability. Usually, an aggressor would pursue relatively quick victory in conventional 
warfare due to cost and time. It is better to end conventional warfare quickly, if an 
aggressor’s political goal or willingness might diminish. According to Mearsheimer, 
“[g]iven that cost is largely dependent on the speed with which objectives are attained, 
we must concern ourselves with determining the conditions under which decision makers 
are likely to conclude that they can quickly achieve their objectives on the battlefield.”62 
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Gerson echoes this idea, adding, “The history of conventional warfare demonstrates that 
most nations desire and develop military strategies designed for rapid, blitzkrieg-style 
wars rather than protracted wars of attrition.”63 If a defender could defend the attack of 
an aggressor in the early phase of conventional warfare, the aggressor would not achieve 
a quick victory. Then, the possibility of extended conventional warfare and the cost of 
provocation would be increased. Eventually, an aggressor could not help giving up 
provocative behaviors.  
In a nutshell, deterrence by denial (or denial capability) can impede the political 
goal and intention that an aggressor pursues through provocations. The important issue of 
deterrence by denial is time. That time is just after conflict begins. If a defender can repel 
an aggressor’s sudden attack, a defender may achieve conventional deterrence. Therefore, 
deterrence by denial is one of the important requirements for conventional deterrence.   
Nevertheless, there would be cases where deterrence by denial does not work. In 
any case of provocation, an aggressor might accomplish his goal depending on his initial 
plan despite the defender’s denial capability. Huntington observes, “An initial offensive 
by a strong and determined attacker, particularly if accompanied by surprise, inevitably 
will score some gains.”64  
There are diverse reasons to support this view: (1) if an aggressor could find the 
weak point of a defender, (2) if benefits that would be gotten through provocations were 
bigger than losses, (3) if there were huge domestic pressures on the aggressor’s leader, 
and so on. Rhodes summarizes those reasons into two factors as follows: 
The first is how potential aggressors frame their understanding of the 
situation confronting them. States that see themselves as confronted by 
domestic or international [losses] if they fail to act are likely to be more 
risk-acceptant—and more likely to be undeterrable for all the reasons 
discussed in this section—than are states that see themselves facing 
possible [gains] if they act…. The second factor is how potential 
aggressors evaluate the relative attractiveness of the offense and the 
defense. If they perceive military technology as favoring the offense over 
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the defense (that is, if they see the offense as the dominant from of 
warfare) then the chances that they are undeterrable again increase.65 
In these kinds of situations, it is very likely that an aggressor will not be deterred 
from provocation. Therefore, there are two remedies for those assumptions. First, 
fundamentally, it is best to let an aggressor know that provocation would yield not only a 
tiny benefit, but also rather huge losses. This idea is linked with credibility. Second, the 
method of conveying the defender’s credibility is retaliation regardless of the level of 
threat.  
b. Punishment Capability (Retaliation) 
Deterrence by punishment is essentially offensive capability. Punishment (or 
retaliation) begins after the provocation of an aggressor. A defender will retaliate against 
an aggressor in order to obtain the reputation of a defender. Therefore, deterrence by 
punishment is the behavior to prevent a provocation of the future. If there were a 
provocation by an aggressor, a defender should retaliate against an aggressor for the 
commitment of practicing the willingness of a defender. As previously mentioned, 
however, past scholars have argued that deterrence by punishment is usually linked with 
nuclear deterrence.66 This concept comes from the original concept of deterrence. As 
described earlier, deterrence is, as Gerson claims, “the threat of force intended to 
convince a potential aggressor not to undertake a particular action because the costs will 
be unacceptable or the probability of success extremely low.”67 Therefore, an aggressor 
would rationally give up provocation after calculation of benefits and unacceptable 
damages. This unacceptable damage means nuclear weapons. According to Charles T. 
Allan, “During the Cold War, deterrence was perceived as a primarily punitive strategy. 
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The cold war punitive definition of deterrence emphasized the devastating effects on the 
targeted society and regime.”68  
Recently, however, deterrence by punishment is not only associated with nuclear 
deterrence, but also conventional deterrence. Through improved conventional 
capabilities, a defender could retaliate with either counterforce or countervalue actions 
against an aggressor.69 According to Allan, “The advocates of true dynamic deterrence 
would emphasize not only the destruction of battlefield targets but also the capability of 
conventional forces to strike strategically throughout the depth of an aggressor state.”70 
Demus has also supported this argument: “[s]ome of the newer conventional capabilities 
such as the Massive Ordinance Air Blast bombs were designed with an eye towards 
increasing conventional weapons’ blast effect, a function of deterrence by punishment, 
not denial.”71 
On the other hand, deterrence by conventional punishment would raise a 
significant issue, the escalation of crisis. If an aggressor had strong willingness for 
provocation, he would inevitably succeed in some part.72 Then, a defender would have to 
retaliate against the provocation of an aggressor. Correspondingly, an aggressor might 
also counterattack against the retaliation of a defender with stronger military power. 
Shimshoni describes the situation of escalation as follows:  
We expect bargaining to take place at a low level but to be dominated by 
the risk of inadvertent escalation. A defender, for example, can initiate 
intentionally low-level violent activity that may—unintentionally—
escalate out of control. If he is more willing than the challenger to accept 
the risk of escalation, then he should prevail in the contest of wills, and 
deterrence holds.73  
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Huntington also emphasizes the role of conventional retaliation. “Almost every 
other form of retaliation against conventional attack involves escalation, either vertical, 
as in NATO doctrine, or, conceivably, horizontal…. Deterrence without retaliation is 
weak; retaliation through escalation is risky. Conventional retaliation strengthens the one 
without risking the other.”74 He also explains the situation of escalation as shown in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  Huntington’s Analysis of Various Flexible Responses.75  
 
 
Therefore, deterrence by punishment highlights the issue of escalation. This issue 
creates a paradox: a strong retaliation threat can be a weaker deterrent for a low intensity 
provocation than for a major one. Conversely, if there would not be any retaliation, the 
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credibility of a defender will be damaged. The best solution (if a country is unable to 
keep status quo), is to retaliate against the provocation of an aggressor through a quick, 
correct, and proportional response.76 Moreover, it is also important to deliver the 
intention that there will be corresponding punishment if an aggressor attempts further 
provocation. Naturally, deterrence by punishment is also associated with credibility.  
2. Credibility  
In a given confrontation either deterrence succeeds and the status quo prevails or 
else the status quo is challenged and deterrence fails. 
—Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence77  
 
The credibility of deterrence depends on an aggressor’s judgment of a state’s 
military capability and political willpower.78 Daryl G. Press explains: “The credibility of 
a threat is defined as the perceived likelihood that the threat will be carried out if the 
conditions that are supposed to trigger it are met. A highly credible threat is one that 
people believe will be carried out; a threat has little credibility if people believe it is a 
bluff.”79 Later in this subsection, the discussion draws in the eight conditions for 
measuring the credibility of conventional deterrence suggested by Press, which are 
included in the criteria of requirements for conventional deterrence developed at the end 
of this chapter and applied to the case study of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. 
As previously mentioned, the most important requirement for conventional 
deterrence is associated with credibility. John Stone emphasizes credibility, stating that 
“[w]hile deterrence theory covers a great deal of other ground, it clearly places credibility 
at the center of matters.”80 Credibility involves an aggressor’s belief (or aggressor’s 
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perception), the willingness of both sides, and the military capabilities for supporting 
their willingness. 
Provocation occurs when deterrence fails. As Robert Art explains, “Deterrence 
therefore employs force peacefully. It is the threat to resort to force that is the essence of 
deterrence. If the threat has to be carried out, deterrence by definition has failed.”81 Thus, 
the failure of deterrence occurs at the moment that a bullet leaves a gun barrel.  
Provocation is the result of an aggressor’s calculation about profit and loss. 
Willingness usually has influence on credibility. If a defender’s willingness were stronger 
than an aggressor’s willingness, it is possible to keep the status quo; in other words, 
deterrence is achieved. The converse situation, on the other hand, yields provocation. 
Therefore, to gain credibility, a defender makes an aggressor believe that loss will be 
greater than profit by showing the defender’s willingness to respond. According to John 
M. Collins, “Prospects of reward or punishment serve deterrence purposes if the 
likelihood that they would be applied appears plausible. Credibility increases that 
prospect from possible to probable in the opinion of opponents, provided incentives are 
neither insufficient nor too intense.”82 This statement confirms that a defender can deter 
an aggressor’s willingness through credibility.  
Conventional deterrence credibility, however, is not a simple problem. In order to 
achieve credibility, which is an abstract concept, a defender faces three primary 
challenges: (1) How to make an aggressor believe the defender’s credibility; (2) How to 
measure credibility; and (3) How to convey that credibility.  
a. How a Defender Can Establish Credibility 
The most significant problem facing a defender is how to make an aggressor 
believe the credibility of the defender. There are two situations in which a defender can 
establish its credibility. First, an aggressor may believe a defender’s credibility when an 
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aggressor could expect a defender’s strong countermeasure based on past experiences.83 
Second, an aggressor can believe a defender’s commitment when the aggressor’s 
potential losses will be greater than any profit after calculating the balance of capabilities 
and the interests at stake in the current confrontation.84  
The “past actions theory” explains that credibility can be formed by past 
experiences. Press mentions that a country’s credibility is created based on its history of 
fulfilling commitments or breaking past promises.85 He summarizes two core claims of 
the past action theory: “(1) a country’s credibility is affected by its record for keeping or 
breaking past commitments; and (2) a history of breaking commitments reduces 
credibility, while a history of keeping commitments increases it.”86 In other words, a 
defender can gain credibility by a record of past retaliation against an aggressor when 
provocations took place. A current provocation would be affected by a defender’s past 
action, and a future provocation will be connected with current action because today is 
the past of the future. In a nutshell, past behavior of a defender is linked with a defender’s 
reputation. As a result, a defender can obtain the credibility of deterrence by its 
reputation, based on its past actions.  
There would be, on the other hand, some instances in which the past action theory 
is not applicable. To be specific, an aggressor might provoke a conflict without regard to 
past experiences under two conditions: (1) when he has enough military power to 
threaten a defender and to achieve its objective; (2) or when the profits to be gained by 
provocation are great enough to offset an aggressor’s costs and risk of provocation.87 
Moreover, if an aggressor had never been in conflict with the defender previously, the 
impact of past action would be lessened. In those cases, a defender could obtain 
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credibility through military balance. Huntington emphasizes how military force 
contributes to deterrence in three ways:  
First, [defenders] may deter simply by being in place and thus increasing 
the uncertainties and potential costs to an aggressor, even though they 
could not mount an effective defense…. Second, military forces can deter 
by raising the possibility of a successful defense and hence forcing the 
aggressor to risk defeat in his effort or to pay additional costs for 
success…. Third, military forces can deter by threatening retaliation 
against assets highly valued by the potential aggressor.88 
The existence of military force is important for gaining credibility, but military 
balance is also a main element for obtaining credibility. According to Paul K. Huth, “The 
immediate balance of forces can critically influence the outcome of a limited aims 
strategy by the potential attacker.”89 An aggressor might not defeat a defender with a 
quick and low cost victory because there is military balance. To be specific, if an 
aggressor wanted a victory through provocation, the aggressor should repel the 
defender’s military forces. Defender’s military forces should hinder the quick and low 
cost victory of an aggressor. Therefore, military existence and military balance could lead 
an aggressor to give up provocation—even though an aggressor ignores a defender’s 
history of upholding commitments, or has no history of any conflicts with the defender.  
Credibility is the most important requirement for conventional deterrence. 
Credibility for conventional deterrence, however, cannot stand alone. When it is 
supported by capability, credibility can truly operate. Credibility without capability is a 
mere bluff. On the other hand, capability without credibility is dynamite without a wick. 
It can never explode. As a result, in order to make an aggressor believe in a defender’s 
credibility, a defender should not only prepare military capability, but also practice 
retaliation against an aggressor’s provocation. Through these behaviors, a defender can 
obtain credibility for conventional deterrence in the present and for the future.  
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b. How to Measure Credibility 
Even though it is understandable that credibility is the most important 
requirement for conventional deterrence, the challenge is to apply that credibility to 
conventional deterrence. Credibility is intangible; it exists only in the thoughts and 
perceptions of the adversary who is to be deterred. Thus, it is difficult to measure 
directly.90 It is also difficult to approach a solution quantitatively with a function or a 
formulation. The better way to gauge credibility is to observe the change in the situation 
and to extract implications for how to affect conventional deterrence. Therefore, this 
thesis borrows from the ideas of Press, the past actions theory, and the current calculus 
theory. Press’s theories are extremely useful because they shed light on the difficult 
problem of measuring credibility. Moreover, through examining those theories, we can 
glean criteria for assessing the failure of conventional deterrence in the 2010 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong.  
(1) Past Action Theory 
As mentioned previously, a defender can obtain its credibility for conventional 
deterrence based on past behaviors. If the past actions of a defender are so important, 
which conditions affect the credibility for conventional deterrence? Press suggests eight 
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Table 2.   Versions of Past Actions Theory.91 
Condition Narrow version Broad version 
Geography Action in one part of the world affect 
credibility in that part of the world 
Actions in one part of the world affect 
credibility everywhere 
Timing Actions in one crisis affect credibility 
for a short period of time 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility 
long into the future 
Similarity of 
issues 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises over similar issues  
Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises over any issues 
Similarity of 
stakes 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises involving similar stakes 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises involving any level of 
stakes 
Same countries Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises that involve the same two 
countries 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 




Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises until one’s own leaders 
change 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 




Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises until the leaders of one’s 
aggressor change 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility in 
future crises even after the leader of 
one’s aggressor change 
Volatility of 
reputation 
Actions in one crisis affect credibility 
only if they create a pattern of repeated 
behavior (repeatedly backing down, or 
repeatedly keeping commitments) 
Single instances of backing down or 
keeping commitments substantially 
affect credibility in future crises 
 
The past actions theory is easy to understand. If a defender fails to keep 
commitments against an aggressor, the defender’s credibility will decrease in the 
future.92 Press suggests eight conditions for the defender to keep its commitments. A 
defender can answer those conditions with “yes” or “no.” If a defender can say “yes,” he 
can establish credibility. There is, however, a precondition that a defender has already 
retaliated for an aggressor’s provocation previously. If there has not been any retaliation 
against the enemy, the enemy may have the view that there will never be retaliation by a 
defender. Therefore, retaliation (or reputation) is the prerequisite to measure credibility 
according to the past actions theory.  
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(2) Current Calculus Theory 
Past actions theory, however, is not sufficient to assess credibility, because a 
situation changes dynamically in the present. Accordingly, an aggressor might ignore 
past actions of a defender and practice a provocation, or an aggressor could still be 
deterred despite past inaction to aggression. Therefore, alternative thinking is necessary 
to make up for the weak points of the past actions theory. That thinking is the current 
calculus theory. According to Press, “Current calculus theory posits that a country’s 
credibility is not tied to its past behavior; when leaders assess credibility in a crisis, they 
focus on the balance of capabilities and interests at stake in the current confrontation.”93 
Although Press is correct up to a point, the difficulty assessing credibility is 
intangibleness. The interests at stake are also hard to assess. Therefore, the portion of 
balance of capability that can be calculated directly is most helpful to assess credibility.  
To access the balance of capability, however, does not mean to evaluate the scale 
of capability. The main point for measuring the balance of capability is whether an 
aggressor has enough capability to achieve its objective94 or a defender has enough 
capability to stem aggressor’s goal. Even though the aggressor’s capability is an 
important factor to evaluate the balance of capability, the defender’s capability is a more 
significant factor to assess credibility eventually. Thus, in order to assess credibility 
through the balance of capability, it is necessary to evaluate the two capabilities of a 
defender, denial capability and punishment capability. It is possible to evaluate a 
defender’s credibility by assessing those capabilities. Ultimately, this kind of assessment 
will be useful for understanding the reasons for the failure of conventional deterrence in 
the 2010 bombardment of Yeonpyeong. 
3. Communication  
How a defender conveys his credibility to an aggressor becomes critical in 
conventional deterrence; that is, communication. Even though a defender may have really 
strong credibility, a defender could fail to deter an aggressor’s provocation when that 
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credibility is not communicated effectively. Then, how does a defender achieve effective 
communication? What is effective communication? The main issues of effective 
communication are the way of communication and the clarity of communication. How 
does a defender convey its credibility to an aggressor? How much information should be 
delivered to an aggressor?  This sub-section discusses these issues to inform the criteria 
of requirements for conventional deterrence developed at the end of this chapter. 
In the case of nuclear deterrence, it is not necessary to worry about the matter of 
communication because the power of nuclear weapons is extremely strong.95 An 
aggressor already knows its destructive power. In the case of conventional deterrence, 
however, an aggressor may not believe a defender’s communication, because an 
aggressor could calculate the next step after the defender’s counteraction. What is worse, 
there are some significant challenges in the communication of conventional deterrence.  
Before discussing effective communication, it is important to know the role of 
communication in conventional deterrence. Communication is a crucial element to 
convey a defender’s credibility to an aggressor. Without any communication between a 
defender and an aggressor, an aggressor will never know about the credibility of a 
defender. According to Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar, “Technology does not speak for 
itself but has to be spoken for. Thus, our apprehension of technical capacity is the upshot 
of our interpreting or being persuaded that the technology will do what, for example, its 
producers say it will do.”96 Therefore, communication is an essential factor to convey the 
defender’s credibility in conventional deterrence.  
Going back to the matter of effective communication, how does a defender 
convey its credibility to an aggressor? The answer is to demonstrate capability. If a 
defender shows its credibility to an aggressor with only some speeches, an aggressor may 
believe that defender’s claim is a “bluff.” Thus, a defender should demonstrate its 
capability in order to reveal its credibility. Stone also emphasizes the importance of 
demonstrating capability. He says that “[s]uch a narrative would presumably involve 
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some robust talk, but need not be limited to words alone. It might usefully be 
supplemented by exemplary acts of force in the form of carefully designed [manoeuvres] 
and firepower demonstrations.”97 The defender’s credibility or military power without 
any demonstration would easily become a scarecrow. Smart crows will immediately 
know that a scarecrow does not move when they attempt to peck grains several times. 
Therefore, effective communication should not merely deliver the message about a 
defender’s credibility by declaration, but also show the defender’s capability by 
demonstration.  
The problem of effective communication is the clarity of communication. The 
clarity (or ambiguity) of communication is sometimes very important to successful 
deterrence. A defender should consider the matter of clarity when it conveys its 
credibility by communication. This thesis calls that situation the “communication 
dilemma.” There are two types of communication dilemma. One centers on the sharing of 
information about military capability. If a defender wants to make an aggressor believe in 
the credibility of the defender’s potential response, to the defender must share 
information about capability. Then, how much information should be shared with an 
aggressor? Shimshoni points out this matter: “The defender is in a real dilemma: To 
deter, he must appear to be ex post superior, capable of executing his deterrent threats. 
But to really be ex post superior, he must keep most of his capabilities secret.”98 In other 
words, in conventional deterrence, if a defender state makes a minute disclosure of its 
capability, an aggressor may attack its weak points, which an aggressor now knows. If a 
defender conceals its capability, an aggressor cannot believe the defender’s promised 
response is credible; and the possibility of provocation will increase. The solution for this 
dilemma is to stand between specificity and vagueness. In plain language, a poker player 
never put all his cards on the table at the very beginning; he opens his cards by stages. He 
merely shows his strong cards to an opponent at the beginning stage. Through this 
process, he can complicate an opponent’s calculations of victory or defeat. In the same 
context, Shimshoni points out the importance of inaccuracy as follows: 
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Given the dynamic nature of conventional forces, both challenger and 
defender are apt constantly to change their force structures, doctrines, and 
tactics in response to inaccurately perceived conditions on the other side. 
The inaccuracy is inevitable because of deception compounded by the 
need for prescience. Sooner or later the challenger is likely to perceive a 
window of opportunity, real or not.99 
Therefore, if a defender state shows only some parts of its critical capabilities to 
an aggressor, the aggressor will have more difficulty calculating loss and profit.  
Moreover, the other communication dilemma centers on the level of warning 
directed at an aggressor, that is, the “red line.” Bruno Tertrais explains the history of the 
red line:  
One of its first contemporary appearances is the ‘Red Line Agreement’ of 
1928 between partners of the Turkish Petroleum Company…. It is used for 
instance in diplomacy to define one’s own position internally (“our red 
line should be…”) in preparation for a negotiation, to state that such-or-
such concession would be unacceptable, or to fix the limits of a 
commitment. Likewise, it is used to privately define a threshold for action, 
often a casus belli.100 
Through examining the history of using “the red line,” Tertrais defines the 
meaning of red line, which is “[t]he manipulation of intents through (mostly public) 
statements for deterrence purposes, referring to the deliberate crossing of a certain 
threshold by an adversary, and relevant counteraction if this threshold is crossed.”101 For 
the purpose of this study, Tertrais provides a good working definition because the red line 
means a kind of warning against an aggressor’s provocative behavior. The purpose of this 
warning voice is to keep the status quo, deterrence. In a manner of speaking, the red line 
is the introduction of communication regarding a defender’s intention to respond or the 
prelude to conventional deterrence. The problem, however, is how a defender utilizes the 
red line.   
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Even though the red line seems to have strong influence on successful deterrence, 
the red line easily fails to deter the provocation of an aggressor in various conditions. 
Tertrais suggests the five shortcomings of the red line as follows: 
Red lines fail when circumstances or consequences are not clear; when the 
adversary is not convinced of one’s determination; when the penalty is not 
greater than the potential benefit. Moreover, red lines encourage adversary 
actions below the threshold. Lastly, red lines will be tested, with risks of 
miscalculation and unwanted escalation.102  
The problems of red lines just mentioned can be linked with the difficulties of 
credibility. The similarities can be summarized in three points. First, the critical point of a 
red line is that a listener (an aggressor) is more important than a speaker (a defender) as 
in the case of credibility. Success or failure in drawing a red line also depends on how 
much an aggressor believes the declaration of a defender. The second point is that a red 
line also faces the risks of miscalculation and escalation because the red line is also a type 
of declaration, not a practice, until provocation occurs. Therefore, an aggressor will test 
the red line to see whether a defender’s commitment is real since an aggressor cannot 
verify a red line without the “reality” test. Finally, an aggressor state also continuously 
calculates its loss and benefit. 
On the other hand, the red line has a different type of particular risk related to the 
issue of credibility. That is, a red line can cause provocation below the threshold.103 
Especially, the clearer the red line, the more provocation may arise since an aggressor 
could calculate that there may not be any countermeasure by a defender under the 
threshold. In 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for instance, clearly drew the 
defensive perimeter from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands, leaving out the Korean 
Peninsula.104 North Korea miscalculated that the United States would abandon South 
Korea. If, however, a defender does not explain the repercussions of the red line to an 
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aggressor, an aggressor may test the edge of the defender’s responses. A defender, thus, 
faces another type of dilemma.  
To borrow Yoel Guzansky’s own words, “If the red line is too vague it is not 
credible; if it is too sharp, it may be more credible but the cost of not realizing it is 
high.”105 Guzansky’s statement confirms the dilemma of the red line. What, then, is a 
wise solution for the dilemma of the red line? Tertrais slightly mentions “fifty shades of 
red,”106 for the solution of the dilemma.  
C. CONDITIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE FAILURE 
A defender can believe that it has done all it can to deter provocation by an 
aggressor when a defender fulfills the requirements for conventional deterrence. 
However, conventional deterrence may still fail despite the defender’s effort. Why does 
conventional deterrence still fail? What conditions of an aggressor cause provocation? 
This section examines three conditions contributing to deterrence failure identified by 
Barry Wolf: 
(1) The weaker state was highly motivated. The high motivation may be 
due in whole or part to a strong commitment to particular values, a 
psychopathological leader, or a “crazy state” mentality. (2) The weaker 
state misperceived some facet of the situation. Misperceptions have 
included instances where the weaker state perceived a vulnerability that 
did not exist; expected no retaliation from the strong; or believed allies 
would come to its aid. (3) The stronger state was vulnerable. Such 
vulnerability may occur in the context of large-scale or low-intensity 
conflicts.107 
Wolf’s taxonomy of deterrence failure can be integrated into two groups by the 
requirements for conventional deterrence, credibility and capability. The first and the 
second conditions are associated with credibility, and the last one is linked with 
capability.  
                                                 
105Yoel Guzansky, “Thin Red Lines: The Syrian and Iranian Contexts,” Strategic Assessment 16, no. 2 
(July 2013): 31, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan16_2ENG5_Guzansky.pdf. 
106Tertrais, “Drawing Red Lines Right,” 15. 
107Barry Wolf, “When the Weak Attack the Strong: Failure of Deterrence,” Rand Corporation (Santa 
Monica, CA: 1991), 5, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2005/N3261.pdf. 
 41 
1. The Motive of an Aggressor 
An aggressor will attack a defender when an aggressor has a strong motive for 
provocation. Wolf proposes three situations when an aggressor provokes a defender 
based on high motivation: high motivation generally, psychopathological leadership, and 
crazy state culture.108 However, in Wolf’s rendering, psychopathological leadership and 
crazy state culture are associated with nuclear deterrence and an aggressor using nuclear 
weapons as the last resort. These motivations, however, cannot apply to conventional 
deterrence, because an aggressor is never facing apocalyptic consequences in low 
intensity conflict. Therefore, this thesis focuses on high motivation in general.  
If the leader of an aggressor state were pressed by internal or external factors, he 
would have strong motives for provocation. Even if he knew that military losses would 
be greater than the profit, he might undertake provocation. According to Wolf, “The 
weaker state struck because conditions had become unbearable, a threat to the country’s 
existence was perceived, or very substantial political advantage was expected to derive 
from the attack.”109 A defender may not anticipate this situation since a defender cannot 
calculate an aggressor’s loss and profit exactly due to limited intelligence of an aggressor. 
For instance, in the case of North Korea, which is an extremely closed country, the ROK 
struggles to obtain sufficient intelligence of North Korea. Moreover, the pressures 
motivating an aggressor are caused by various factors. Economic crisis, domestic 
political conflict, and the deterioration of an international situation may threaten the 
regime of an aggressor, driving the leader of aggressor state to consider a drastic solution 
to overcome these pressures. In a crisis, provocation can serve to deflect people’s 
attention from internal to external matters and concentrate all national efforts. Thus, 
internal and external pressures are high motivation for provocation.  
2. Misperception of an Aggressor 
The past actions theory or the current calculus theory cannot perfectly explain the 
reasons for the failure of conventional deterrence. An aggressor states sometimes is 




swayed by its belief about the situation, not rational calculation. For this reason, 
provocations have occurred. Wolf identifies three conditions in which an aggressor 
practices provocation resulting from misperception: “(1) The Weaker Country Perceives 
a Vulnerability That Does Not Exist, (2) The Weak State Expects No Retaliation from the 
Strong State, (3) A State Counting on Allies Attacks a Substantially Stronger State or Its 
Ally.”110 The following discussion amends Wolf’s framework to apply to modern 
conventional deterrence, based on its different environment.  
a. The Weaker Country Perceives a Vulnerability that Does not Exist   
When an aggressor’s military power is largely overrated compared with 
defender’s military power, an aggressor perceives a vulnerability that is not really 
there.111 There are two cases in which an aggressor may believe a false vulnerability of a 
defender. The first case is that an aggressor has not had any opportunity to check the 
defender’s capability. Thus, an aggressor state may overestimate its own capability. 
Specifically, North Korea may be overconfident of its military capability. It seems the 
strength of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is greater than that of the ROK in a simple 
comparison of the number of troops.112 In order to estimate military capability, however, 
a state should consider diverse and sophisticated elements, including alliance, 
technology, and fighting spirit. It is hard to know the exact strength of military capability 
before fighting directly. North Korea had not fought with the ROK on land such as in an 
artillery duel. Therefore, the North Korean military could have had the misperception of a 
false vulnerability.  
The other case of a false vulnerability is a type of propaganda. If the leadership of 
an aggressor state has strong reasons for provocation, an aggressor’s leadership may 
persuade and encourage the military for victory. In order to stir up military passion, the 
leadership of an aggressor state must show its military strength and a defender’s 
vulnerability regardless of whether these perceptions are true.  
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b. The Weak State Expects No Retaliation from the Strong State 
A defender may have strong credibility and capability to deter provocation; but if 
an aggressor believes that a defender will not retaliate against sudden attack, deterrence 
may still fail. Wolf categorizes this situation according to two types of cases: “(1) The 
Substantially Stronger State is Itself Attacked, and (2) Another Nation is Attacked and 
the Much Stronger State Intervenes.”113 This perspective seems to apply to North Korean 
provocation against the ROK-U.S. alliance, which has more powerful military capability. 
But this aggressor’s viewpoint could be a misperception associated with the past actions 
theory of credibility. If a defender or its ally did not counterattack in the past, an 
aggressor might believe that a defender will not retaliate this time, too; because an 
aggressor learns from the past actions of a defender. On the other hand, even if a defender 
showed the credibility of its intent to respond to an aggressor through past actions or its 
capability, an aggressor may still question the credibility of the defender due to various 
circumstances. Misperception is the egocentric driver of an aggressor for calculating 
provocation. Thus, even the requirements for conventional deterrence cannot prevent 
provocation, when an aggressor is guided by misperception.  
c. A State Counting on Allies Attacks a Substantially Stronger State or Its 
Ally 
If an aggressor thinks it can count on military support from its allies, an aggressor 
might misperceive the prospects of provocation. This situation is related with escalation 
of crisis. Conventional deterrence inevitably involves the problem of escalation of crisis. 
The escalation of crisis can mean expanding the scale of conventional conflict. If an 
aggressor believes that a defender might be worried about those escalations, an aggressor 
may initiate provocation. Wolf gives such an example: 
A perfect historical example of a weak state counting on its own allies 
attacking a strong state or that state’s ally is the attack upon the Swiss 
town of Solothurn by the Count of Kiburg-Burgdorf in 1383. The Count, 
who was deeply in debt, hoped that if he captured the prosperous town, his 
overlord and allies would aid him against the powerful Swiss 
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confederation, which could be expected to attempt to recapture the town. 
As it turned out, the Count’s gamble failed.114 
In the same context, North Korea could also use the card of low intensity 
provocation because North Korea might strongly have faith in Chinese military support 
based on historical lessons. However, in the dynamics of international relations, China 
may change its posture and act in its own interests in the future. That is the reason why an 
aggressor mistakenly counting on allies would be a serious misperception. 
3. Vulnerable Defender 
The last situation is one in which an aggressor state may attack when it finds out 
the weak points of a defender.115 This situation is connected with the defender’s 
capability. As previously mentioned, there are two types of capability, denial capability 
and punishment capability. If an aggressor detected a defender’s weak points, it might 
perceive that the defender does not have denial capability. Under these conditions, 
deterrence hinges on punishment capability.  
D. CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE OF LIP  
This thesis so far has explained what elements should be considered to establish 
conventional deterrence. In order to deter, a defender should retain two requirements, 
capability and credibility. Those two requirements, however, have various types of 
subclassifications, and each subclassification directly or indirectly affects the success of 
conventional deterrence. Therefore, in order to achieve conventional deterrence, a 
defender state should consider diverse elements of its capability and credibility. 
Moreover, a defender should also consider that an aggressor may provoke for reasons 
outside the defender’s control, based on the aggressor’s own situations. Therefore, it is 
necessary to deal with all considerations of conventional deterrence at once. 
To consider all elements of conventional deterrence comprehensively, this chapter 
concludes with a table presenting conventional deterrence criteria that can be applied for 




analyzing LIP. The table includes all elements of conventional deterrence success or 
failure discussed in the preceding chapter. Although the table is based on the analysis of 
requirements for conventional deterrence generally, the criteria can be used to evaluate 
the prospect for successful deterrence of LIP. 
To determine which elements may account for conventional deterrence failure, 
the author also applies the table to representative cases of North Korean LIP. By applying 
the table to the cases, then, we can find the pattern of North Korean LIP and the weak 
point of the ROK for conventional deterrence.  
Table 3 summarizes the criteria for the analysis of requirements for conventional 
deterrence discussed previously: 
Table 3.   Conventional Deterrence Failure Analysis Matrix 
Criterion Index of LIP 
Capability 
(1) Denial Capability  








(5) Similarity of issues  
(6) Similarity of stakes  
(7) Same countries  
(8) Own leaders remain  
(9)Adversaries’ leaders remain  
(10) Volatility of reputation  
Communication (11) Warning with Demonstration    Sum/2 (12) Strategic vagueness  
Aggressor’s 
situation 
(13) Motives  
Sum/3 (14) Misperception  
(15) Vulnerable defender  
Total Sum 4.00 
※ Note: The ‘0’ index of deterrence means to keep the status quo, conventional deterrence.  
          The ‘1’ index of deterrence means to set the condition of LIP. 
          Therefore, there is a higher possibility of LIP when the sum is a greater number.   
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The following chapter provides a detailed case study of the North Korean 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. This incident presents a recent critical case of 
LIP. The narrative is organized around the criteria presented in the preceding table, and 
provides a coding for the disposition of each criterion in this case. Specifically, an 
element that contributes to keeping conventional deterrence is coded “0.” An element that 
contributes to setting the conditions for LIP and accounting for deterrence failure is 
coded “1.” To provide equal weighting of the four major categories, the evaluation of 
each specific element is averaged within the category. The sum of those averaged figures 
provides a general index of LIP, ranging from “0” to “4,” with a finding of “4” signifying 
the highest possibility of LIP. 
 47 
III. THE CASE STUDY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF 
YEONPYEONG IN 2010 
The preceding chapter examined which requirements determine success or failure 
in conventional deterrence. In 2010, the ROK-U.S. alliance was the defender who failed 
to deter North Korean LIP, and North Korea was an aggressor who provoked the ROK. 
Which requirements played important roles for the failure of conventional deterrence? In 
other words, why did the ROK-U.S. alliance fail to deter North Korean LIP, or why did 
North Korea feel free to bombard Yeonpyeong in 2010? This chapter finds the answers 
through applying the requirements for conventional deterrence to the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong in 2010. To develop the answer, this chapter first reviews what happened in 
Yeonpyeong in 2010. Then the chapter applies the requirements for conventional 
deterrence presented in the table at the conclusion of Chapter II to the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong. Through this application, it is possible to better explain why the ROK-U.S. 
alliance failed to deter North Korean LIP.  
A. OVERVIEW 
North Korea’s military, the KPA, opened fire on Yeopyeong Island on November 
23, 2010. This was the first shelling by North Korea on the territory of the ROK since the 
signing of the Korea War Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. The Defense White 
Paper of the ROK simply explained the outline of the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong 
Island as follows: 
Around 14:34, on November 23, 2010, the North’s military (Korean 
People’s Army: KPA) fired 170 artillery shots at Yeonpyeong Island, 
South Korea. In response to this attack, the Yeonpyeong unit of the ROK 
Marine Corps immediately returned fire against the North using K-9 self-
propelled artillery. Such illegitimate and inhumane provocation by the 
North, which was aimed at a civilian residential area as well as the ROK 
marine base, resulted in the deaths of two civilians and two ROK marines 
and many other civilians and marines being severely or slightly injured.116 
                                                 
116Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper (Seoul: March 
31, 2011), 335. 
 48 
Figure 2.  The Map of Yeonpyeong Island and Northern Limit Line (NLL).117 
 
 
The unprecedented situation was moving direly. The KPA continued the shelling 
of Yeonpyeong for about one hour. The sequence of the bombardment is described in the 
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Table 4.   Description of the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong in a Time Sequence.118 
Time Sequence The Details of the Incident 
10:15 ~ 14:30 The Yeonpyeong unit carried out a regular maritime shooting training 
exercise in the ROK Maritime Firing Zone, south of the NLL. 
14:34 ~ 14:46 
The KPA indiscriminately fired multiple rocket launchers (MRL) located 
on the Gaemori coast and its coastal artillery guns on Mudo (Island), 
North Korea, at the ROK marine base (Yeonpyeong unit) and civilian 
residences. Sixty out of around 150 shots from the MRL and the coastal 
artillery launcher bombarded the ROK base and civilian residences on 
Yeonpyeong Island. The other 90 shots fell into the sea.  
14:47 ~ 15:15 
After issuing a warning to the North twice, the Yeonpyeong unit 
responded to this attack by firing 50 rounds of its K-9 self-propelled 
artillery at the North’s coastal artillery base.  
14:50 
The ROK Air Force (ROKAF) launched F-15K and KF-16 aircraft in 
preparation both to conduct retaliatory strikes against KPA positions and 
engage the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) Mig-23s should they 
undertake hostile actions. 
15:12 ~ 15:29 
The KPA carried out a second attack—this time on the Command Post of 
the Yeonpyeong unit and the ROK radar base—by firing 20 rounds from 
its MRLs and coastal artillery. 
15:25 ~ 15:41 
In response to the North’s second attack, the Yeonpyeong unit responded 
by firing 30 rounds from its K-9 self-propelled artillery at the North’s 
coastal artillery position on the Gamori coast.  
 
In the end, two marines and two civilians of the ROK were killed, and 18 people 
were wounded by the shelling.119 Moreover, the total of 133 building, power station, and 
communication facilities were damaged. Wildfire occurred at ten areas.120 On the other 
hand, it was hard to know that how many casualties and damage to the KPA resulted 
                                                 
118Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper (Seoul: March 
31, 2011): 335–36; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., ‘The Yonpyong-do Incident, November 23, 2010,’ 38 
North Special Report 11–1 (January 11, 2011): 7.   
119Mark McDonald, “‘Crisis Status’ in South Korea after North Shells Island,” New York Times, 
November 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
120Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper (Seoul: March 
31, 2011), 336. 
 50 
from the counterattack of the ROK marines. According to Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., 
however, “A ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman, referring to the Mu-do strike, stated 
that satellite images ‘… show our shells landed on a cluster of barracks in North Korea, 
so we presume there have been many casualties and considerable property damage.’”121 
Figure 3.  North Korean MRLs, M-1992 (Left) and M-1993 (Right).122 
 
Figure 4.  K-9 Self-Propelled Artillery of the ROK Marines on Yeonpyeong Island.123 
 
 
One of the reasons for the bombardment of Yeonpyeong presented by North 
Korea was retaliation for the Hoguk exercise. According to McDonald, “The attack on 
Yeonpyeong came as 70,000 South Korean troops were beginning an annual nationwide 
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military drill called Safeguarding the Nation. The exercise has been sharply criticized by 
Pyongyang as ‘simulating an invasion of the North’ and ‘a means to provoke a war.’”124  
The Hoguk exercise, however, had been conducted annually since 1996.125 
Moreover, North Korea argued that the other reason for the bombardment was that “the 
ROK recklessly fired into our sea area.”126 This argument was related to North Korea’s 
claim of the so-called “Chosun West Sea Military Demarcation Line” in 1999.127 The 
North Korean argument was not accepted by either the ROK or the United Nations 
Command (UNC). According to Moo Bong Ryoo, “The UNC side stated that the NLL 
issue was nonnegotiable, because the demarcation line had been recognized as the de 
facto maritime border for 46 years by both Koreas.”128 North Korea did not have any 
legal and diplomatic foundation for supporting their argument.  
Therefore, the argument of North Korea was a pretext, hiding some other reasons 
for the bombardment. This leaves the question of why the ROK-U.S. alliance failed to 
deter the bombardment. In order to find out the reasons, this chapter applies the 






                                                 
124McDonald, “‘Crisis Status.’” 
125Bermudez, “The Yonpyong-do Incident,” 4. 
126McDonald, “‘Crisis Status.’” 
127Moo Bong Ryoo, “The Korean Armistice and the Islands,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: 








B. ASSESSMENT OF THE FAILURE OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE  
The ROK-U.S. alliance failed to deter North Korean LIP at Yeonpyeong in 2010. 
Why could the ROK-U.S. alliance not prevent the subjective consequence? This section 
analyzes the reasons for the conventional deterrence failure in this case by applying each 
requirement for conventional deterrence to the bombardment of Yeonpyeong. Then, this 
chapter draws lessons from the result of this analysis.  
1. Capability 
The ROK-U.S. alliance was assessed that it had strong punishment capability but 
did not have denial capability at Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. This sector minutely 
examines the capabilities of the ROK-U.S. alliance at Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.  
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a. Denial Capability 
As previously mentioned, the ROK-U.S. alliance should have denial capability to 
prevent North Korean LIP. Denial capability means the ability to deny the attack of an 
aggressor with military balance, defensive capability, and offensive capability. The 
moment of demonstrating denial capability is from just beginning of the LIP to just after 
the LIP.  
Then, what was the level of the denial capability of the ROK-U.S. alliance at the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010? In this section, this thesis assesses the level of the 
denial capability of the ROK-U.S. alliance at the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 
through distinguishing into three categories, which are military balance, defensive 
capability, and offensive capability.  
(1) Military Balance 
The ROK-U.S. alliance did not have enough military forces for military balance at 
Yeonpyeong Island. The most significant reason for military imbalance was that the ROK 
military ignored the deployment of North Korean military forces. Such a military balance 
cannot be established immediately. Particularly, ground forces need more time than other 
forces such as navy or air force.  
Also, it was quite clear that the ROK-U.S. alliance did not share intelligence 
sufficiently and did not cooperate efficiently as regards the analysis of intelligence. 
Because when the ROK military ignored the intelligence about North Korean ground 
forces deployment, there was not any warning or advice from U.S. military. According to 
Dong-A Ilbo, “Though the North deployed forward 122-millimeter multiple rocket 
launchers at a cannon base in Gaemeori in Hwanghae Province two days before and on 
the day of the Yeonpyeong attack, the South failed to detect the situation.”130 The KPA 
forward deployed the 122 mm MRL battalion to the south of the village of Kaungol on 
Kangnyong-bando131 as follows: 
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Figure 6.  The Deployment of North Korean Artillery.132 
 
 
As a result, when North Korea fired artillery from the 122 mm MRL and 76.2 mm 
guns, the ROK military counterattacked with only four of six 155 mm K-9 self-propelled 
howitzers; because the AN/TPQ-37 Fire Finder counter-battery radar of K-9 self-
propelled howitzers had been broken by North Korean shelling.133 Since the ROK 
military ignored the intelligence of deployment of 122 mm MRL, the ROK military did 




not prepare sufficient ground forces. Only four 155 mm K-9 self-propelled howitzers, 
however, were ready for combat against North Korean LIP. The KPA might have 
calculated that their ground forces were sufficiently bigger than the ground forces of the 
ROK. Thus, this military imbalance was a contributing factor for North Korean LIP. 
(2) Defensive Capability 
The ROK military did not possess sufficient defensive capability at Yeonpyeong 
Island against North Korean shelling. The Yeonpyeong Island is located 12 km (6.5 nm) 
south of the North Korean coast, and it is home to 1,780 civilians.134 So, Yeonpyeong 
Island has been vulnerable to any type of North Korean attack such as shelling or an 
amphibious landing operation by the KPA. Thus, the ROK military deploys a Marine unit 
of approximately 1,000 troops at Yeonpyeong to protect the island against the attack by 
the KPA.135 Bermudez introduces details about the Marine unit:  
The unit is augmented by various intelligence components and two 
artillery batteries. The first artillery battery is equipped with six 105 mm 
towed howitzers; the second with six 155 mm K-9 self-propelled 
howitzers and a number of K-10 armored ammunition resupply vehicles. 
Over the years the island has been fortified with numerous underground 
bunkers, hardened artillery sites, beach defenses, POL storage facilities, 
three helicopter pads, C4ISR facilities, fortified fighting positions and a 
number of other military related facilities.136 
The ROK Marine unit seemed to be a well-prepared military unit against attack 
by the KPA. The KPA, however, attacked on weak points at a vulnerable time. First, the 
KPA delivered an attack on soft targets, civilians’ facilities. Even though the Marine 
units were fortified with diverse methods, civilian facilities were vulnerable to shelling 
by the KPA. Christine Kim demonstrates the damage of Yeonpyeong Island as shown in 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  Damage on Yeonpyeong Island.137 
 
 
Moreover, even though K-9 self-propelled howitzers might have been protected 
by a hardened artillery site, the K-9s were exposed to the shelling of the KPA, because 
the K-9s were “still positioned to the southwest for the earlier live firing exercise,” claims 
Bermudez.138 This damage was also related to the disregard for the intelligence about the 
deployment of the KPA. The ROK military could not efficiently defend against the 
shelling of the KPA and could not sufficiently counterattack against the shelling since the 
KPA attacked on weak points at a vulnerable time. If the ROK Marine artillery would 
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have been intact after the shelling of the KPA and might have immediately 
counterattacked the original point of North Korean shelling, the ROK military could have 
achieved conventional deterrence. 
(3) Offensive Capability 
From the perspective of a defender, if the ROK military might have attacked the 
original point of shelling when North Korea opened shelling on Yeonpyeong Island, the 
ROK military would have achieved conventional deterrence by impeding the aimed 
shelling of the KPA. North Korea might not have achieved its original goal of the 
shelling due to the strong resistance of the ROK military. But, the ROK Marine artillery 
failed to attack the original point of shelling because of the malfunction of AN/TPQ-37 
Fire Finder counter-battery radar. So, the K-9 self-propelled howitzers could attack on the 
pre-planned targets, which were command posts and barracks on Mu-do, with only 50 
rounds. After repairing the radar, 30 rounds of K-9 self-propelled howitzers were fired at 
the original point of shelling.139 
In a nutshell, the ROK military could not possess denial capability for 
conventional deterrence since they did not have military balance, defensive capability, 
and offensive capability. The noticeable fact was that the lack of denial capability came 
from a lack of intelligence that was provided before the incident.  
b. Punishment Capability 
As previously mentioned, punishment for provocation is a prerequisite for the 
conventional deterrence in the future. Punishment capability, however, has two 
considerations. The considerations are the promptness of counterattack and the 
proportion of firepower. These considerations are related with the escalation of crisis. If a 
defender delays the counterattack, an aggressor will also retaliate at a later time. 
Therefore, punishment should be practiced as soon as possible for conventional 
deterrence. In this sense, air power is the most appropriate method for punishment, 
“[b]ecause of its independence of surface limitation and its superior speed—superior to 
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any other known means of transportation— the airplane is the offensive weapon par 
excellence,” Giulio Douhet claims.140 On the other hand, air power could cause the 
problem of disproportionate firepower because the firepower of aerial bombardment 
would be greater than ground artillery. If a defender were to retaliate with stronger air 
power, an aggressor might retaliate with much stronger weapons, causing escalation of 
the crisis. This is the reason why a decision maker avoids using air power. Nevertheless 
air power is the most effective method for punishment.  
The ROK military had sufficient punishment capability. At 14:50 hours, F-15K 
and KF-16 jet fighters made a sally for retaliation against the shelling of the KPA and for 
engaging the KPAF MiG-23s.141 Since the ROK military prepared F-15K and KF-16 jet 
fighters in 16 minutes, it is possible to assess that promptness was satisfied. On the other 
hand, the F-15K was loaded with an air-to-surface missile. This powerful weapon could 
cause controversy about the proportion of firepower. The air-to-surface missile of the F-
15K, however, was a precision-guided munition (PGM). Even though the firepower of 
this weapon was also stronger than the shelling of the KPA, the F-15K could offer an 
attack focused only on the original point of the shelling of the KPA without collateral 
damage. Thus, it is also possible to assess that the proportion of firepower was satisfied. 
The leadership of the ROK hesitated to utilize air power in consideration of escalation of 
the crisis,142 but it is clear that the ROK military had sufficient punishment capability.   
2. Credibility  
If the ROK-U.S. alliance would have had better credibility for conventional 
deterrence against any North Korean LIP, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong might not 
have occurred. So, this section demonstrates the previous efforts of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance to establish credibility for deterring the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. 
But, the most difficult point related to the credibility of the ROK-U.S. alliance is how to 
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measure it. Since credibility is an abstract concept, as previously mentioned, it is hard to 
prove whether credibility was established or not. So, this section borrows Press’s idea of 
past action theory, described in the previous chapter. Through a brief application of the 
past action theory, it will be possible to demonstrate whether the ROK-U.S. alliance had 
credibility to deter the bombardment of Yeonpyeong. Then, the next section discusses the 
issue of the communication of credibility.  
a. Geography 
The northwest islands (NWI) of the ROK, which are known as the UNC control 
island group, have been the most dangerous place between the ROK and North Korea. 
There were four major conflicts in the NWI before the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 
2010.143 The conflicts included the first battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999, the second battle 
of Yeonpyeong in 2002, the battle of Daecheong in 2009, and the sinking of ROK’S 
Cheonan in 2010.144 If the ROK-U.S. alliance would have threatened North Korea from 
the first battle of Yeonpyeong, the later provocations might have been prevented. Since 
North Korea had calculated that the profits that came from provocations in the NWI were 
bigger than the losses, North Korea provoked again in the same region.  
b. Timing 
Just before the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, there was the sinking of 
ROKS Cheonan on March 26, 2010.145  At that time, the government of the ROK was 
confused about how to deal with the incident. The ROK took a lot of time to demonstrate 
that the incident was a North Korean provocation. So, the ROK could not help missing 
the opportunity to administer military punishment, and the ROK did not have enough 
time to realign the military for efficient defense in the NWI. The poor posture of the 
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ROK might have diminished the ROK’s conventional deterrence credibility in the eyes of 
North Korea. Therefore, North Korea conducted the bombardment of Yeonpyeong as a 
type of further provocation within a short period of time.  
c. Similarity of Issues 
The superficial reason for the bombardment of Yeonpyeong was the issue of the 
NLL. From 1973, North Korea has argued that the NLL is not an acceptable demarcation 
line. According to Jon M. Van Dyke, Mark J. Valencia, and Jenny Miller Garmendia, 
“North Korea announced that South Korean and [U.S.] vessels will be allowed to move to 
and from the five islands only through two designated sea routes and that any deviation 
from these routes would be regarded as a violation of North Korean territorial waters.”146 
The ROK, however, has stated that “the NLL has been the practical sea demarcation line 
between South and North Korea for the past 49 years and was confirmed and validated by 
the 1992 South-North Basic Agreement.”147  
These divergent opinions between the ROK and North Korea created the 
conditions for the four major conflicts in the NWI.148 When North Korea made 
provocations in the NWI after the 1990s, Pyongyang always denied the validity of the 
NLL and violated the line.149 The ROK-U.S. alliance, however, did not effectually 
resolve the issue of the NLL. This unsolved issue resulted from the posture of the United 
States about the NLL. Even though the United States condemned the North Korean 
provocations, the U.S. government did not clearly express its view about the issue of the 
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NLL.150 Of course, there were various reasons for the United States to remain silent 
about the NLL; but if the United States had a strong willingness to resolve the issue of 
the NLL, North Korea may not have caused a provocation in a connection with the NLL. 
The issue of the NLL, however, ended in smoke after each provocation; North Korea 
could always assert that the reason for its provocation in the NWI was the NLL.  
d. Similarity of stakes 
North Korea had provoked in the vicinity of the NLL due to the similarity of the 
stakes. The bombardment of Yeonpyeong was an extension of these stakes. There were 
two similar stakes related to the NLL, economic profits and security issues. First, the 
issue of economic profits was related with the blue crab. The vicinity of the NLL was 
famous as a fertile fishing ground. In particular, fishermen could get a good blue crab 
catch in the vicinity of the NLL. Moreover, North Korean merchant vessels had to select 
a circuitous route for entering the West Sea, forcing them to spend more time and fuel.151 
In a nutshell, the NLL was related to the North Korean economy.  
Second, security was at stake for the NLL. The reason for North Korea not to 
accept the validity of the NLL as a line of demarcation was that the NLL was an 
important defense line for the capital of the ROK, Seoul. According to Terence Roehrig, 
“Moving the NLL south would allow North Korean warships to patrol closer to Seoul and 
the Han River estuary, which leads to the South Korean capital, and Incheon. This in turn 
reduces warning time for a DPRK attack and brings Pyongyang’s Special Forces, one of 
the strengths of its military, nearer to South Korean territory.”152 Therefore, the ROK 
would never grant a concession to North Korea regarding the NLL. On the other hand, 
North Korea could pursue a strategic security-related benefit through making noise 
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regarding the issue of the NLL. As a result, North Korea continuously made provocations 
in the NWI for the stakes just mentioned.  
e. Same Countries 
The LIPs in the NWI were concerns between the ROK and North Korea. 
According to Press, “Action taken in a crisis between two countries affects these states’ 
credibility in future crises with each other, but not in future crises involving different 
countries.”153 The bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 was caused by the credibility 
that was formed by the past conflicts between the ROK and North Korea. To be specific, 
the previously mentioned four major conflicts in the NWI were inter-Korea issues. North 
Korea might intentionally exclude the United States. For instance, there was the annual 
Hoguk 2010 exercise from November 22 to November 30.154 The United States had often 
participated in the Hoguk exercise, but the United States canceled its participation in the 
exercise because of concerns about neighboring countries’ sensitive reactions.155 
Therefore, North Korea might decide to make a provocation at Yeonpyeong Island on 
November 23, 2010 since North Korea could fight with only the ROK.  
f. Defender’s Own Leaders Remain 
The same leaders remaining in power affects credibility for conventional 
deterrence. According to Press, “Actions taken by a country affect its credibility as long 
as its senior political leaders remain in office; the effect on credibility disappears once the 
senior leaders leave office.”156 The statement of Press is relevant when conventional 
deterrence has been successfully maintained. On the other hand, leaders remaining in 
power also affects credibility negatively in the case of failed conventional deterrence. 
The case of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 explains the negative effect on 
credibility in the case of failed conventional deterrence. Even though there were many 
                                                 
153Press, Calculating Credibility, 19–20. 
154Bermudez, “The Yonpyong-do Incident,” 3. 
155“Deciphering North Korea’s Provocations,” STRATFOR, November 24, 2010, 
https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/deciphering-north-koreas-
provocations?0=ip_login_no_cache%3Dc59f3aeaa34656e5a783c40f2d044494. 
156Press, Calculating Credibility, 20. 
 63 
criticisms of the Minister of National Defense after the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan on 
March 26, 2010, President Lee Myung-bak remained in office, as did the Minister of 
National Defense, Kim Tae-young.157 Therefore, North Korea might think that there 
would be no strong counteraction by the ROK military under the leadership of Kim Tae-
young.  
g. Aggressors’ Leaders Remain 
Similarly, when the same aggressors’ leaders remain in office it affects the 
defender’s credibility. If aggressors’ leaders were changed after a provocation, a defender 
should prepare extra efforts for getting new credibility. On the contrary, if the same 
aggressors’ leaders remained after a provocation, the same type of provocation or even a 
more advanced provocation might occur; since the leaders of the aggressors’ side can 
reasonably expect the same level of credibility from a defender. The regime of Kim Jong 
Il (KJI) directly ordered the ROK’s Choenan sinking and the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong. Victor Cha states that KJI directly gave the command to attack Cheonan 
warship.158 Moreover, according to Stephen McDonell, “[t]he country’s leader Kim 
Jong-il visited the artillery base which attacked the South just hours before this week’s 
shelling started. The report said he was accompanied by his son and heir Kim Jong-un. If 
true, it would suggest that orders for the artillery attack came right from the top.”159 
Therefore, North Korea remained the same decision maker, KJI, from the past 
provocation of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010.  
In addition, there were some noticeable changes in the leadership of the KPA 
before the ROKS Cheonan sinking. Before the incident, the KJI regime executed 
personnel transfers in the KPA. According to Bruce Bechtol, “Only weeks after the 
rhetoric began in January 2009, Gen. Kim Kyok-sik, formerly chief of the General Staff, 
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was named the new commander of IV Corps of the North Korean People’s Army. The IV 
Corps borders the NLL. Kim Kyok-sik was well known as one of Kim Jong-il’s most 
trusted generals.”160 Moreover, another important general changed his assignment after 
Gen. Kim Kyok-sik’s change of position. General O Kuk-ryol changed to an important 
position that was related with LIP. According to Gause, “[t]he head of the Operations 
Department (which was then under the authority of the Korean Worker’s Party), General 
O Kuk-ryol, was moved to a senior position on the National Defense Commission 
(NDC), the chief command and control organ of North Korea’s armed force.”161 After 
these two generals came to the forefront, the nature of North Korean provocation became 
more aggressive.162  
Therefore, North Korea might have provoked the bombardment of Yeonpyeong 
since there was a continuation of the aggressive leadership of the KPA from the Cheonan 
sinking. The same aggressive military leadership tested the credibility of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance in regard to what countermeasures they would take against North Korean LIP. 
The leadership of the KPA might have calculated that the profit of LIP would be bigger 
than the losses.  
h. Volatility of Reputation 
A continuative pattern of behavior affects credibility.163 The indecisive attitude of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance against North Korean LIPs in the NWI affected the credibility of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance. Even though there were special characteristics of the situation 
that South and North Korea have confronted, the ROK-U.S. alliance did not practice any 
military action of revenge after the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan. Of course, there was a 
strong condemnation and warning by the ROK-U.S. alliance against North Korean LIP 
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after the Cheonan sinking.164 The ROK-U.S. alliance, however, did not practice military 
retaliation.  
There were some reasons why the ROK-U.S. alliance did not retaliate against the 
North Korean LIP. It took 56 days to demonstrate that the Cheonan sinking was caused 
by the North Korean.165 Therefore, the ROK-U.S. alliance lost the opportunity to retaliate 
immediately because the ROK military had complicated rules of engagement (ROE).166 
The ROE of the ROK military was that the retaliation would be restrained by the 
principle of proportion and the principle of promptness.167 This ROE was related with the 
escalation of crisis.168 If the ROK military counterattacked against North Korean LIP, the 
KPA could retaliate with stronger power. These aggressive retaliations would go to 
extremes and eventually might escalate into a full-scale war. Thus, the ROK-U.S. alliance 
would have hesitated to retaliate against North Korean LIP, and North Korean leadership 
was assured that there would not be strong retaliation after provocation. In a nutshell, the 
credibility of the ROK-U.S. alliance was damaged by these past actions.  
3. Communication 
In order to establish strong credibility, the method of communication is also 
important. The ROK-U.S. alliance, however, did not have an effective method of 
communication before the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010.  
As previously mentioned, there are two ways of effective communication, the 
demonstration of capability and the red line. First, the demonstration of capability is 
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related with military capability and military balance. The demonstration of capability 
means to show both defensive and offensive capabilities to North Korea. In the same 
context, the forward deployment of the 122 mm MRL battery of the KPA was a signal for 
communication by demonstration of the capability of the KPA. The problem, however, 
was that the ROK-U.S. alliance did not properly respond to the signal. If the ROK-U.S. 
alliance showed that sufficient military forces were deployed in the NWI before the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong, North Korea might not have undertaken the LIP at 
Yeonpyeong Island.  
Moreover, the ROK marine unit did not have sufficient defensive and offensive 
capability. The ROK marine unit exposed the location of the K-9 self-propelled howitzers 
due to a live-fire exercise for Hoguk Exercise.169 The unit of the K-9 self-propelled 
howitzers did not have enough time to go back to shelter, and were targeted by the 
shelling of the KPA.170 Even though the K-9 self-propelled howitzers were the best 
weapons to counterattack immediately, they were exposed to the shelling of the KPA and 
had lost defensive capability.  
In addition, KPA shelling disabled the defective anti-artillery radar (AN/TPQ-
37).171 Thus, the ROK Marines had difficulty detecting the original point of the shelling. 
Their counterattack just aimed at the pre-planned targets that were “the command post 
and barrack on Mu-do.”172 This countermeasure could not stop North Korean 
bombardment, and then, there was the second barrage of the KPA after the initial barrage. 
Moreover, even though the ROK had an air asset to attack the original point of the North 
Korean shelling, the ROK did not practice the air strike. According to Bechtol, “[t]hough 
South Korean F-15K strike fighters were scrambled in response to the attack, they took 
no action because the rules of engagement at the time called for strictly an equivalent 
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response.”173 Therefore, the ROK did not have effective offensive capability after losing 
the opportunity of counterattack at the beginning of the North Korean LIP.   
Furthermore, the ROK-U.S. alliance did not have the red line for conventional 
deterrence at that time. As previously mentioned, the red line is a kind of warning against 
an aggressor’s provocative behavior. Even if a LIP had occurred in the past, a defender 
may have declared a red line for preventing provocation in the future. A red line is 
different from a condemnation. A red line must explain a certain standard for the pattern 
of behaviors to satisfy the requirements of future conventional deterrence.  
The ROK-U.S. alliance, however, did not propose a red line for conventional 
deterrence after North Korean LIPs of the past. According to Kim, “There is not any type 
of red line that was declared by the ROK ministry of national defense, Chairman of the 
Joint of Staff, or the Navy Chief of Staff such as statements, command letters, and 
instructions for protecting the NLL before 1996.”174 Moreover, while the ROK 
government and the U.S. government announced condemnation and various economic 
and diplomatic sanctions against North Korea after the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, 
the ROK government did not propose any obvious military action plans for conventional 
deterrence.175 Condemnation or rhetorical expressions cannot be a red line.  
If it does not show concrete action plans, the ROK-U.S. alliance should at least 
propose a red line for conventional deterrence. For instance, the Ministry of National 
Defense of the ROK mentioned the original point of attack for the first time after the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Kim Kwan-Jin who was the 43rd Minister of 
National Defense of the ROK, said that “[t]he military of the ROK will firmly punish 
North Korean LIPs through attacking the original point of provocation and supporting 
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facilities.”176 The ROK-U.S. alliance did not have credibility for conventional deterrence 
before the bombardment of Yeonpyeong since the alliance did not propose a red line for 
conventional deterrence. In a nutshell, the ROK-U.S. alliance did not communicate its 
credibility effectively.  
4. Nevertheless, Provocation 
The bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 might have been inevitable even if the 
ROK-U.S. alliance had capability and credibility for conventional deterrence. This is 
because North Korea had strong motives for LIP and also may have misperceived the 
situation, while it also recognized the weak points of the ROK military. Under these 
conditions, there was nothing to stop North Korea from LIP. So, this section examines 
three conditions for conventional deterrence failure, which are proposed by Wolf. 
a. Motives 
Even though North Korean misperceptions and the weak point of the ROK 
military contributed to North Korean LIP, North Korean motives for LIP were the most 
important reason for LIP. In other words, North Korea might have made a provocation 
even if the ROK-U.S. alliance had both of capability and credibility in 2010, because the 
KJI regime was pressed by internal and external factors. Particularly, the era from 2009 
to 2012 was a significant time for North Korea. This was the time of the hereditary 
succession of power from KJI to Kim Jong Un (KJU).177 Therefore, the internal factors 
of North Korea were strong motives for LIP. This section examines the internal factors 
by categorizing them into two situations, the political and economic situation.  
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(1) Political Situation 
The most important concern in North Korean politics was the power dynamic 
among the upper classes, which included KJI, a successor, the Secretariat Central, 
military leaders, cabinet members, and central power agencies. The time from 2008, 
which was the year that KJI recovered from his cerebral infarction, to 2010, which was 
the year of the ROKS Cheonan sinking and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong, was 
particularly significant. In this period, North Korea had three difficulties that included 
strained relations with the ROK, a worsening in relations with the United States, and 
deterioration of the internal economic condition. To overcome these difficulties, North 
Korea took a hard line on domestic and international situations. Moreover, in this period, 
KJI made a decision that the succession system was progressing effectively. 
The hereditary succession of power from KJI to KJU started after the summer of 
2008. According to Jae-Cheon Lim, “KJU reportedly became the successor to his father, 
KJI, in late 2008 or early 2009. North Korea made official the succession at the Third 
Party Conference in September 2010.”178 To be specific, Kyu-Sub Chung said that “from 
2008, there were some terms, which inferred the succession issue, such as ‘revolution 
succession to the third generation’ and ‘new generation’ on the official media of North 
Korea.”179 This meant that the hereditary succession to KJU had begun through the 
idolization of KJU. According to Joon-Sam Lee, “From January 2009, there was a rumor 
that KJI designated KJU as his successor, and “Balgyeolum (step),” which was a song 
idolizing KJI, was also diffused.”180 As Tania Branigan notes, “The anthem, 
titled ’Onwards Toward the Final Victory,’ is part of a propaganda drive to build up the 
image of the ‘great successor.’ Radio and television are airing it several times a day and 
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the score has been printed in the official newspaper Rodong Sinmun.”181 Dae-Sik Oh has 
also described some part of the hereditary succession to KJU through the idolization of 
KJU. He explains: 
The term of Dang Jungang (Party Centre) reappeared on Rodong Sinmun 
in 2009; the Party Centre had been called KJI who was the successor of 
Kim Il Sung (KIS) in the 1970s. The North Korean government gave 
caring money to people after the currency reform in 2009 on KJU’s 
instructions. And in order to raise KJU’s charisma, the North Korean 
government manipulated his age to 30 in 2012, because that year was 
KJI’s 70th birthday and the 100th anniversary of the birth of KIS.182 
Finally, North Korea officially declared the hereditary succession from KJI to KJU on 
September 28, 2010. Hae-In Shin said that “[t]he promotion of KJU to the rank of general 
in the North’s Korean People’s Army was announced in time with the opening of the 
country’s largest political gathering in 30 years, during which the elder Kim was largely 
expected to make official his hereditary succession plans.”183 Thus, it was necessary to 
achieve something to complete KJU’s idolization. As a result, North Korean LIP, the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, was a way of achieving the birth of new North 
Korean leadership. 
Moreover, KJU had a weak foundation for the legitimacy of his power. Ho-Yeol 
Yoo said, “KJU was only 27 years old, and he only had the justification that was he was 
the grandson of KIS for a hereditary succession. Because of the weak foundation of his 
regime, there were many critical opinions about the establishment of a hereditary 
succession.”184 Even though new military authorities who emerged after the 
representative gathering in September 2010 protected KJU, the other military authorities 
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and others in the upper class were opposed to a hereditary succession. Sung-Wook Nam 
said, “In this situation, it was inevitable for KJU to provoke against South Korea for 
suppressing opposition forces in the early stages.”185 
In a nutshell, the North Korean regime put emphasis on establishing the 
hereditary succession from KJI to KJU in 2010. But, KJU was different from his father, 
KJI; KJU had not had enough time to burnish his image for having authority as a 
successor. Thus, he faced obstacles gaining the trust of the class with power and with the 
common people. So, the North Korean regime in 2010 might believe that LIP could be 
the way to overcome this political situation. 
(2) Economic Situation 
North Korea adopted the “survival strategy of 2005 model year.” Oh has 
explained the meaning of the survival strategy of 2005 model year as follows:  
Economic reform was driven by the Cabinet from 2000 to 2004. This, 
however, was incapacitated by attacking of Korean Worker’s Party. Thus, 
economic policy was transformed to a ‘counter-reformative opening and 
expanding route,’ that included a restrained market, restrained economic 
activities by military unit, strengthened national economic plan, expanded 
special economic zone for the business of foreign currency earning, and 
expanded influx of aid.186 
The cooperation of the ROK would make or break this counter-reformative 
opening and expanding plan. Actually, the heyday of this plan was in October 2007. 
There, however, was an accident in which a North Korean soldier shot and killed a South 
Korean tourist who wandered into a restricted zone on July 11, 2008. So, North Korea 
could not expect any more cooperation from the ROK due to strained South-North 
relations. It was a danger signal for the plan of establishing hereditary succession and the 
long-term strategy for constructing a strong and prosperous country. 
To overcome this crisis, the North Korean government got down to business with 
China when Wen Jiabao, who was the Premier of the People’s Republic of China, visited 
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Pyeongyang in October 2009. According to Oh, “The North Korean government 
requested massive aid from the Chinese government, and he wanted China rather than the 
ROK to become a partner for a special economic zone for the business of foreign 
currency investment.”187 Moreover, the North Korean government tightened up an 
already restrained market and restrained economic activities by military units. Finally, the 
North Korean government pushed ahead with currency reform, which was an extreme 
policy, on November 30, 2009. According to Scott Snyder, “North Korea’s objective in 
pursuing the revaluation, therefore, was aimed at curbing the markets and reinstituting 
state control over the markets and over public reliance on the state.”188 It, however, failed 
to return to the planned economic system. Snyder has also explained the reason for that 
failure: “At the technical level, initial implementation of the currency revaluation was 
undermined by the inability of the state to have sufficient goods on hand to restore the 
public distribution system as a replacement to the market.”189 As a result, the currency 
reform effort caused a sharp price rise, a rise in the exchange rate, and hyperinflation. 
The following is a table for the result of currency reform. Prices are expressed in North 
Korean won. According to Figure 8, even though North Korea announced that it would 
exchange new currency for old currency at the rate of 100:1, prices and exchange rates 
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Figure 8.  North Korean Price Fluctuation by the Currency Reform Program in 2009.190 
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These economic policies were initiated to consolidate KJU’s power by attempting 
to return to a planned economy. However, it ended in failure. This failure could fully 
amplify people’s discontent about KJI’s regime and the hereditary succession system to 
KJU.  
In this difficult situation, the government of the ROK made a decision to 
discontinue almost all trade between South and North except the Gaeseong Industrial 
Complex, because the government of the ROK concluded that Cheonan warship was 
sunk by a North Korean torpedo fired by a midget submarine. With the failed currency 
reform policy, the decision of the ROK would have a ripple effect on the North Korean 
regime. Gang-Taek Lim showed empirical evidence that “North Korean foreign currency 
income would be decreased $252,620,000 by stopping trade between the South and 
North. This evidence included presumed toll processing, income from carriage of goods, 
and ascending expense by prohibiting passage through Jeju Strait.”191 
Moreover, the international society reduced humanitarian aid to North Korea 
because North Korea intensified nuclear armament and provoked continually with 
nuclear and missile activities. Bo-Ra Jung reports that the “international society provided 
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support in the amount of $20,600,000 to North Korea as humanitarian aid in 2010, but 
that was at a 35% level compared with $58,750,000 in 2009.”192 
To resolve the economic problems caused by strained South-North relations and 
the sanctions of the international community, KJI visited China twice in May and August 
2010. The main purposes of his visiting were to acquire massive aid to replace that lost 
from the ROK and to support the North Korean counter-reformative economy through 
investment in a special economic zone for the business of foreign currency investment. In 
fact, various trade agreements and memorandums of understanding, which spurred the 
development of the Rason Special Economic Zone, the development of Hwanggumpyong 
Island, and the joint development of underground resources, were concluded between 
China and North Korea. North Korea, however, has struggled in business ventures with 
China. Hyeong-Joong Park asserts that “[i]n spite of KJI visiting China twice, North 
Korean businesses with China did not look promising because China passed careful 
judgment about the capriciousness of North Korea and hidden dangers in the business 
with North Korea.”193  
Eventually, North Korea wanted to resolve the problem of regime instability and 
to achieve hereditary succession of KJU from KJI through the survival strategy of 2005 
model year, which was the same as the counter-reformative opening and expanding plan, 
but North Korea’s regime was in an even deeper crisis due to the aforementioned factors: 
strained South-North relations, the failure of currency reform, and the slow progress of 
business with China. In short, North Korea had difficulty to inflow funds from outside 
parties, which were the ROK, China, and international community. The reasons for North 
Korean economic difficulties were the stopping of trade between South and North by 
North Korea’s sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, the decrease of international aid to North 
Korea, and China’s careful stand about supporting North Korea. Therefore, North Korea 
had to find another way to resolve these difficult situations. That solution was a LIP.  
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b. Misperception 
North Korea might have made the decision to execute LIP out of a misperception. 
Even though North Korea is generally inferior in military power to the ROK,194 the 
North Korean regime has argued that its military can overcome that inferiority by sheer 
willpower.195 This argument was effective enough to persuade the KPA because the 
ROK and North Korea have not fought directly with military forces on land.196 North 
Korea might think that the ROK military would not retaliate immediately by airpower 
due to the stipulations on proportion of firepower written in the Armistice Agreement, 
and the ROK would hesitate to retaliate against North Korean shelling due to the threat of 
nuclear weapons and the escalation of crisis.197  
North Korea might also have calculated that the United States would not engage 
in any retaliation because they made certain that the United States initiates military power 
with care. Therefore, North Korean leaders might have believed that they could take the 
advantageous position in later negotiation after the surprise attack.  
c. Vulnerable Defender 
The vulnerability of the ROK military has been mentioned several times. Once 
North Korea detected the weak point of the ROK military, the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong in 2010 may have been inevitable. If North Korea had discovered the weak 
point of ROK military at another location, the name of the LIP incident might have been 
changed.  
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This vulnerability of the ROK military is related with the logic of conventional 
deterrence. Particularly, conventional aggression usually pursues “relatively quick, 
inexpensive victories.”198 If the target is sturdier than what an aggressor expected, it will 
take more time and cost for the victory. Therefore, an aggressor seeks to detect the weak 
point of a defender as a prerequisite for LIP. In the same context, North Korea selected 
Yeonpyeong Island as the target of shelling because the island was the weak point of the 
ROK military, and North Korean leaders might have believed that they could achieve a 
quick victory.   
C. OVERALL ANALYSIS 
Provocation means a defender fails to have the requirements for conventional 
deterrence. In other words, the reasons for failure are the absence of requirements for 
success. Many events that happened at Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 conform to the 
elements of conventional deterrence discussed in Chapter II. Table 5 summarizes the 
preceding analysis of the Yeonpyeong Island LIP by utilizing the conventional deterrence 
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Table 5.   Application of Conventional Deterrence Requirements to the Bombardment 
of Yeonpyeong in 2010. 
Criterion Index of LIP 
Capability 
(1) Denial Capability 1 
0.5 (2) Punishment Capability 0 
Credibility 
(3) Geography 1 
1 
(4) Timing 1 
(5) Similarity of issues 1 
(6) Similarity of stakes 1 
(7) Same countries 1 
(8) Own leaders remain 1 
(9) Adversaries’ leaders remain 1 
(10) Volatility of reputation 1 
Communication (11) Warning with Demonstration   1 1 (12) Strategic vagueness 1 
Aggressor’s 
situation 
(13) Motives 1 
1 (14) Misperception 1 
(15) Vulnerable defender 1 
Total Sum 3.5 
 
The result of the application is noteworthy. Almost all the criteria were indicative 
of deterrence failure, and coded “1,” with the total sum of “3.5.” The result indicates that 
Yeonpyeong Island had very high possibility for LIP before the shelling by the KPA. 
Although the ROK-U.S. alliance should have considered various elements for 
conventional deterrence, the ROK-U.S. alliance did not take into account elements for 
conventional deterrence for the most part.  
Why, then, was the ROK-U.S. alliance negligent in considering the elements for 
conventional deterrence? It is possible to find out the reasons for carelessness in the table. 
The punishment capability is the only element that contributes to keeping conventional 
deterrence and is coded “0.” This phenomenon means the ROK-U.S. alliance might have 
been complacent about its military power. The ROK leaders might have believed that 
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they had sufficient conventional power compared with North Korea, and the ROK also 
expected the United States would ensure the extended deterrence under the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella.199 Even though the general military power of the ROK-U.S. alliance was 
bigger than North Korea’s, the ROK-U.S. alliance might have overlooked detailed parts 
of conventional deterrence. That was a type of vanity. The result of vanity was that 
almost all criteria were coded “1,” which points to a very high possibility of LIP, as was 
the case when the KPA fired artillery at Yeonpyeong Island. As a result, the ROK-U.S. 
alliance failed to deter North Korean LIP. 
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The bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010 was a pivotal incident for the national 
security of the ROK. Even though there had been numerous North Korean provocations, 
it was the first direct attack of the KPA on the territory of the ROK by artillery since the 
end of the Korean War. So, it provides the opportunity to consider conventional 
deterrence for the first time as a case of the failure of conventional deterrence. Since 
people can develop through failures, the ROK should extract some lessons from the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010.   
1. Credibility 
This thesis argues that credibility is the most important requirement for 
conventional deterrence. If a defender state has established its capacity, capability, and 
willingness to retaliate, it has credibility for conventional deterrence, and an aggressor 
may hesitate to execute LIP. At least, an aggressor state is likely to calculate its potential 
losses and profits from any provocation with more sophistication. The ROK-U.S. 
alliance, however, did not have sufficient credibility to deter North Korean LIP. 
First of all, the ROK lost credibility for conventional deterrence through its past 
actions. Credibility comes greatly from past actions. In other words, credibility can be 
called reputation. Conventional deterrence is the dynamic relationship between a 
defender’s credibility and an aggressor’s provocation. An aggressor continuously tests a 
defender’s credibility and may be on the alert for an opportunity to initiate a provocation. 
If a defender does not take countermeasures properly against an aggressor’s LIP, an 
aggressor may make even stronger provocations in the future. In the same context, since 
the ROK-U.S. alliance did not show its intention to retaliate to North Korea in the past, 
North Korea eventually shelled Yeonpyeong Island. If the ROK-U.S. alliance had 
established credibility through strong military punishment, the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong might have been deterred by the credibility of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
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Second, credibility can be formed when it is communicated effectively. 
Credibility does not come from a slogan, but from the visible demonstration of military 
power and practice. Credibility can be imprinted in the aggressor’s awareness when a 
defender puts its commitment into practice. The ROK-U.S. alliance, however, did not 
demonstrate military power by practicing its commitment. On the other hand, to give a 
verbal warning can cause another problem. As previously mentioned, red lines encourage 
an aggressor’s provocative behavior below the threshold. If a defender announces that 
there is the critical point that will trigger conventional deterrence, an aggressor may 
practice provocative behaviors below that point if it considers that LIP incurs tolerable 
losses.  
But, surprisingly, the ROK-U.S. alliance did not have any red lines for 
conventional deterrence in the NWI until after the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. 
Of course, in response, there was condemnation, sanctions, and a word of warning by the 
governments of the ROK and the United States. Those responses consisted of general 
arguments or non-military action. Even though there is a dilemma of red lines, the ROK-
U.S. alliance might have demonstrated a feasible action plan, not an abstract principle or 
condemnation. While the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan occurred in the same year, the 
ROK did not mention any type of red lines after that incident either. In a nutshell, the 
ROK-U.S. alliance did not have a sufficient method to communicate its capability, 
capacity, or willingness for conventional deterrence of these kinds of provocations.    
2. Capability 
Capability is also a significant requirement for conventional deterrence. Many 
observers believe that the ROK military failed to deter North Korean LIP because the 
ROK did not have “sufficient capability” at Yeonpyeong Island. In other words, 
provocation occurred because the military balance was broken. A defender can achieve 
conventional deterrence by military balance. As discussed in the prior chapter, however, 
military balance around Yeonpyeong Island was broken. The KPA forward deployed 
numerous 122 mm MRLs and “76.2 mm coastal defense batteries at Kaemori and on Mu-
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do,”200 but the ROK Marines prepared only six K-9 self-propelled howitzers for the 
combat.  
The important point, however, is why the imbalance of artillery occurred between 
the ROK Marines and the KPA. The answer is the ROK military ignored the warning by 
ROK intelligence.201 Even though the ROK military already had the information of the 
movement of a KPA 122mm MRL battalion south, the ROK military did not practice any 
contingency plan. This disregard for intelligence may come from the inherent advantage 
of being an aggressor. An aggressor can select the time and place of a surprise attack. On 
the other hand, a defender has to consider all ways for preventing damage from any 
surprise attack of an aggressor. It is hard to know the exact time and location of a 
provocation. So, this disadvantage of a defender may cause the disregard of intelligence 
by a defender because there could be many repeated fallacies of intelligence, such as the 
Boy Who Cried Wolf. As a result, the military balance was broken at Yeonpyeong Island, 
and the bombardment occurred.  
In order to overcome the disadvantage of a defender, a defender has to consider 
punishment capability. This concept is eventually related with credibility for 
conventional deterrence. Even though a defender cannot choose the time and location of a 
provocation, a defender can prevent a future provocation through strong punishment. If 
the ROK military had executed punishment against North Korean LIP in the past, it 
might have ultimately prevented the bombardment from occurring. The implementation 
of punishment capability, however, has two significant considerations, the rules of 
engagement and the escalation of crisis. 
When the KPA opened artillery fire, the ROK Air Force launched F-15K and KF-
16 for executing retaliation against and counteracting North Korean air power.202 The 
pilot of the ROK air force, however, did not push the bomb button because of 
sophisticated rules of engagement.203  Even though the ROK military had punishment 
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capability, they hesitated to use that capability because they were concerned about 
civilian casualties and escalating the crisis.204  
The ROK leadership recognized that the hesitation to employ punishment 
capability would cause a damaged reputation. So, the ROK leaders changed their posture 
about the rules of engagement after the bombardment of Yeonpyeong. According to 
Bechtol, “Rules of engagement were adjusted to shift from a paradigm designed to 
prevent an escalation to a focus on effectively repulsing attacks.”205 In the same context, 
Kim Kwan-Jin, who was appointed the 43rd Ministry of National Defense of the ROK 
after the bombardment of Yeonpyeong, strongly called for immediate punishment.206 
Kim stated, “Don’t ask whether to shoot or not. Shoot first and report later.”207  
Furthermore, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong illustrates that the escalation of 
crisis is an inevitable issue related to conventional deterrence. All requirements for 
conventional deterrence must eventually be weighed against escalating the crisis. A 
defender’s leader cannot help considering the escalation of crisis in a crucial moment of 
conventional deterrence: to decide the intensity of punishment, to retaliate against LIP to 
preserve reputation, to propose red lines for effective communication of conventional 
deterrence, and so on. Clearly, a small incident may cause a major result, as in the 
“butterfly effect.” Moreover, as North Korea is an aggressor that has nuclear weapons, 
escalation would threaten ultimately use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the ROK should 
prepare for an escalated crisis through efficient utilization of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  
3. The ROK-U.S. Alliance 
The ROK-U.S. alliance should be an agency of response to North Korean LIP. 
Conventional deterrence may escalate to total war or nuclear crisis. Then, the ROK, 
which does not have nuclear weapons, cannot help requesting U.S. support through the 
                                                 
204Ibid., 83. 
205Ibid. 
206Jon Rabiroff and Yoo Kyong Chang, “South Korea Readying Forces to Respond to Future Attacks 




extended deterrence relationship. Among the alternative solutions for the escalation of 
crisis, the ROK-U.S. alliance is the most realistic solution for conventional deterrence.  
North Korea has also recognized the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance for 
conventional deterrence because North Korea did not provoke the United States after the 
Panmunjom axe murder incident. North Korea has only made provocations against the 
ROK.208 North Korean LIP aimed at the ROK suggests that North Korea also knows the 
escalation of crisis is inevitable. Therefore, North Korea probably wants to manage LIP 
for quick victory. If so, North Korea has recognized that the ROK-U.S. alliance will be 
an agency of conventional deterrence, and North Korea be cautious about provocation.  
4. The Motives for North Korean LIP 
The motives for provocation are as important as the requirements for conventional 
deterrence. Even though the ROK-U.S. alliance will prepare to prevent provocation with 
capability and credibility, North Korean LIP may occur anyway when North Korea has 
strong motives for provocation.  
Yet, it is unnecessary to accept that LIP is unavoidable. Even if LIP were 
inevitable, a defender can minimize the shock of LIP through preparation of the 
requirements for conventional deterrence. Therefore, the first step in these preparations is 
to keep watch on an aggressor’s changes, including political transformation and 
economic changes. Then, a defender may detect the internal motives for LIP. Moreover, 
the requirements for conventional deterrence will disrupt an aggressor’s successful 
execution of LIP. Under the aggressor’s strong motives for LIP, the requirements for 
conventional deterrence may not stop the LIP of an aggressor. Denial capability, 
however, can minimize the damage from LIP, and punishment capability would be 
important to prevent any further LIP.  
B. PRESCRIPTION 
This thesis suggests some prescriptions for preventing future North Korean LIP 
based on the lessons learned. Even though the prescriptions cannot resolve all North 
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Korean LIP perfectly, they will be helpful to prohibit North Korean LIP and to bolster the 
reputation of the ROK-U.S. alliance for preventing North Korean LIP.  
1. Credibility: Counter-Provocation Plan in 2013 
This thesis argues that credible conventional deterrence is the most effective 
method to prevent North Korean LIP. Therefore, the ROK-U.S. alliance should try to 
obtain credibility for having effective conventional deterrence and a willingness to use it. 
While there are various ways to gain this credibility, this thesis suggests exploiting the 
red line for conventional deterrence. As previously mentioned, the ROK-U.S. alliance did 
not propose any red line after North Korean LIPs; the allies merely condemned North 
Korean provocative behaviors and practiced economic sanctions. These repeated 
situations would have provided the conditions for North Korean LIP since the ROK-U.S. 
alliance hesitated to use military force out of concern that such action would escalate the 
crisis. The ROK-U.S. alliance cannot obtain credibility for conventional deterrence this 
way. The alliance should show its strong credibility through proposing a red line to North 
Korea.  
In the same context, the counter provocation plan in 2013 was a very meaningful 
attempt to show the credibility of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The concept of a counter 
provocation plan (CPP) was mentioned for the first time at the 42nd ROK-U.S. Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM).209 The ROK-U.S. alliance had agreed to the 
comprehensive security of the ROK and mentioned the issue of total war against North 
Korea in the previous SCM.210 The ROK-U.S. alliance, however, gave shape to the 
concept of a counter provocation plan and announced the CPP in the 45th SCM in 2013. 
According to the minutes of the 45th SCM, “The Minister and the Secretary praised the 
two militaries for completing the ‘ROK-U.S. Counter-Provocation Plan’ in March 2013, 
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which enables the two countries to respond jointly and effectively to North Korean 
provocations, and reaffirmed that the plan would be crucial in enabling the Alliance to 
respond firmly to any North Korean provocation.”211 The ROK-U.S. alliance thereby 
announced its commitment to act together substantively to counter North Korean LIP. 
The details of the CPP were not revealed to the public and North Korea. This 
concealment of the CPP is a wise policy because the CPP is a way of establishing red 
lines. The ROK military just mentioned the existence of the CPP when North Korea 
shelled the southern of Military Demarcation Line (MDL) in 2015, and there was not any 
further provocation after the first shelling. According to CNN, South Korean Defense 
Minister Han Min-koo stated, “‘If North Korea continues on provoking, our military—as 
we have already warned—will respond sternly, and end the evil provocations of North 
Korea,’ … adding the country is working closely with the United States.”212 Moreover, 
the spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK said that the CPP has 
been operating since just after the North Korean shelling.213  
This encounter makes it possible to observe that the ROK military warned North 
Korea with a red line. In order to display the power of the red line, the red line should be 
implied rather than specified. This quality is called “the fifty shades of red.” Obviously, 
there is a plan to retaliate against North Korean LIP, but the details of the plan are 
purposely vague. North Korea can know there is a red line, but cannot know what 
specific LIP might cross that line. Therefore, North Korea cannot help calculating 
intricately the result of provocation before or during the execution of LIP. As a result, the 
ROK-U.S. alliance could have credibility for conventional deterrence.   
The CPP, however, has a limitation. Even though the CPP is one of the effective 
red lines, the CPP will be tested continuously by North Korea. If there were not any 
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Security Consultative Meeting (Seoul: October 2, 2013), http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/
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212Jethro Mullen, Kathy Novak, and Greg Botelho, “North Korea Issues Military Threats as Tensions 
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213Young-jae Lee, “ROK-US Alliance Military System Is Operating after North Korean Shelling,” 
Yonhap News Agency, August 21, 2015, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2015/08/21/
0200000000AKR20150821040200043.HTML. 
 86 
substantial practice for verifying the CPP, North Korea would not believe the efficacy of 
the CPP. Eventually, there should be a punishment against any North Korean LIP. The 
punishment will extend the efficacy of the CPP and will be helpful to increase the 
credibility of conventional deterrence. In the same context, the counteraction of the ROK 
against North Korean shelling in 2015 was the proper confrontation to verify the CPP and 
maintain credibility for conventional deterrence.214  
2. Capability 
To deter North Korean LIP, the ROK-U.S. alliance must have both denial 
capability and punishment capability. Even though the alliance already had some 
capabilities for conventional deterrence, the capabilities should be enhanced. This section 
suggests the ways of reinforcing capabilities for conventional deterrence against North 
Korean LIP. 
a. Denial Capability: Military Balance 
The strongest way to prevent North Korean LIP is to have denial capability. This 
denial capability could be established by having military balance. The problem, however, 
is that it is hard to have military balance correspondingly due to the mobility of military 
forces. The ROK-U.S. alliance should deploy military forces against the movement of the 
KPA. One of the reasons for the failure of conventional deterrence was ignoring the 
deployment of the KPA in preparation for the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. 
Therefore, the key issue of military balance will be the power of intelligence. The ROK-
U.S. alliance has to share intelligence about the deployment of the KPA and respond 
properly with a similar level of military deployment.  
Even though the ROK-U.S. alliance would deploy military forces correspondingly 
against the deployment of the KPA, military balance will still be hard to establish 
perfectly, because North Korea holds the key of LIP—North Korea can select the place 
and time to provoke. Thus, the LIP depends upon the determination of North Korea. As a 
                                                 
214Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Ian E. Rinehart, and Brock R. 
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result, credibility for conventional deterrence, which is intended to affect North Korean 
determination, is the key issue for deterring North Korean LIP. Military balance will be a 
part of actualizing credibility for conventional deterrence. This process is naturally 
connected with punishment capability. 
b. Punishment Capability: Reinforcement of Conventional Weapon System 
To gain credibility for conventional deterrence, a defender must have punishment 
capability. The ROK-U.S. alliance cannot establish credibility and reputation for 
conventional deterrence without this capability. While punishment capability is a key 
issue for conventional deterrence, carrying out punishment is often hindered by two 
concerns: the rules of engagement and the method of military retaliation.  
(1) ROE 
Every issue of punishment is related with the escalation of crisis. One of the 
reasons for the failure of conventional deterrence was that the ROK-U.S. alliance was 
trapped by the maze of potential escalation of crisis. The majority of leaders had serious 
concerns about escalating the crisis before they decided whether to carry out punishment. 
This hesitation caused repeated North Korean LIP and wounded the alliance’s reputation 
for conventional deterrence. Therefore, the ROK-U.S. alliance should establish simple 
ROE for preventing hesitation over retaliation, and the alliance should announce the ROE 
clearly to North Korea. Moreover, it is not necessary to include other considerations in 
the ROE. The key point of the ROE is promptness and the principle of proportion. As a 
result, establishing simple ROE and warning in advance about ROE will remove the 
danger of escalation of crisis.  
(2) Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM) 
The issues of ROE, which are promptness and the principle of proportion, are 
very important for conventional deterrence. The principle of an eye for an eye is the best 
guide for punishment against North Korean LIP. The ROK military, however, has usually 
missed the opportunity to retaliate against North Korean LIP because North Korea 
selected forms of LIP that that made it hard to retaliate with the principle of proportion. 
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Therefore, the ROK-U.S. alliance should prepare several proposed methods of retaliation 
for overcoming established ways of military punishment.  
In the same context, the announcement by Kim Kwan-Jin, who was the 43rd 
Minister of National Defense, was very significant. Kim declared that the ROK will 
counterattack the original point of North Korean LIP.215 His declaration was an advanced 
method of retaliation compared with existing ways, and the ROK military could obtain 
more credibility for conventional deterrence through his announcement.  
To achieve Kim’s declaration, the ROK must develop the PGM of the air force. 
The PGM can attack, with surgical precision, only targeted North Korean facilities, 
minimizing collateral damage. Therefore, the PGM can prevent the escalation of crisis. 
Even though North Korea would argue that using PGM is excessive and violates the 
principle of proportion, using PGM would be the most restrained way of retaliation. The 
PGM will aim at the original point of LIP. Moreover, the ROK military will have already 
warned North Korea to expect the use PGM in response to LIP. Therefore, the ROK 
military can establish strong punishment capability with the PGM and can obtain 
credibility for conventional deterrence.  
3. ROK-U.S. Alliance 
Even while the ROK military establishes credibility and capabilities for 
conventional deterrence in various ways, the escalation of crisis is still a significant issue 
for conventional deterrence. This issue stems from the difficulty of ensuring that KJU’s 
regime is integrally stable, and verifying North Korea’s claims to have nuclear 
capability.216 Therefore, North Korean LIP can escalate to a high-intensity provocation 
or total war.  
In this situation, the ROK cannot help depending on the ROK-U.S. alliance for its 
national security, because the ROK does not have nuclear weapons. A conventional 
                                                 
215“South Korea’s Defense Minister Vows Airstrikes if North Korea Attacks,” CNN, December 3, 
2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/12/03/south.korea.threat/. 
216Kyle Mizokami, “Welcome to North Korean Nuclear Weapons 101,” The National Interest, 
September 26, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-north-korean-nuclear-weapons-101-13940. 
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provocation may change into total war that includes using nuclear weapons. The wisest 
option that the ROK can select would be the cohesion of the ROK-U.S. alliance. There 
are two reasons why the alliance is the smart option.  
First, the ROK’s national security can be ensured under U.S. extended deterrence. 
According to Yonhap News Agency, “South Korea and the U.S. agreed on Monday that 
they will not tolerate any aggression or military provocation by North Korea, reaffirming 
the U.S. commitment to provide ‘extended deterrence’ against the communist country’s 
growing nuclear threats.”217 Through extended deterrence, the ROK can offset the threat 
of North Korean nuclear weapons and any type of provocation.  
Second, the ROK can obtain advanced intelligence capability with U.S. support. 
Providing this capability is part of the agreement of the ROK-U.S. alliance.218 In order to 
counterattack the original point of LIP, the ROK should secure the exact location of the 
target. The ROK, however, does not have enough intelligence capability yet. Therefore, if 
the ROK could share the U.S advanced intelligence capability, the ROK can develop its 
punishment capability and establish credibility for conventional deterrence.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH  
This thesis applies the requirements for conventional deterrence to the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Such a single case study is helpful to examine an 
incident deeply, but in itself such a study is limited. Therefore, a future researcher can 
examine other North Korean LIP across the whole period from after the end of the 
Korean War, using the criteria found in this thesis.  
For instance, a future researcher can choose to examine some of these major cases 
of North Korean LIP: (1) the axe murder in the Panmunjom, (2) the sinking of Cheonan 
warship in 2010, and (3) North Korean shelling in 2015. Then, using the requirements 
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matrix found in Table 3, it is possible to input an index for each case. For lack of space, 
this thesis did not deal with detailed specifics of each case. But as an approximation, the 
result of application of the requirements matrix to the three cases might result in the 
coding summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6.   The Application of the Conventional Deterrents Matrix to Specific Cases for 
Future Research. 
Criterion Index of LIP Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 








(4) 1 0 1 
(5) 1 1 0 
(6) 1 1 0 
(7) 1 1 1 
(8) 1 1 0 
(9) 1 1 1 
(10) 1 1 1 








0.33 (14) 1 1 1 
(15) 1 1 0 
Sum 3 3.375 0.955 
※ Note: Case 1 is the axe murder in the Panmunjom. 
                 Case 2 is the sinking of Cheonan warship in 2010.  
                        Case 3 is North Korean shelling in 2015. 
 
Applying the analysis to multiple cases, it would be possible to find meaningful 
patterns in the indices summarized in this table. For example, the summary figures 
indicate that the intensity of North Korean LIP was stronger in cases having the higher 
index number. On the other hand, where the sum of index was smaller, the intensity of 
LIP was weaker. In other words, if the ROK-U.S. alliance would have had requirements 
for conventional deterrence in each case, the intensity of North Korean LIP may have 
been weaker.  
 91 
If a future researcher completes the input to the index for all North Korean LIP, a future 
researcher can draw a graph that shows the pattern of North Korean LIP, which might 
show results such as in the one that follows in Table 7.  
Table 7.   The Pattern of North Korean LIP. 
 
 
Even though there are diverse theories explaining the reasons for North Korean 
LIP, this graph shows the interesting result of analysis. Each highest apex is matched up 
with the early stage of the regime of Kim’s family. Therefore, it could be possible to 
demonstrate a correlation of North Korean regime transition and North Korean LIP by a 
quantitative method. This thesis only suggests a method of analysis and leaves the task of 
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APPENDIX.  THE MAP OF KOREAN PENINSULA 
Map adapted from University of Texas Libraries, “The Map of the Korean 
Peninsula,” University of Texas, accessed October 10, 2016, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/
maps/korea.html. The map was modified because there is no map of Korean peninsula 
that depicts the East Sea and Dok-do, including Yeonpyeong Island. 
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